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ABSTRACT 
 
 
CASH HOLDINGS OF PUBLICLY UNLISTED REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
BY 
 
Kenneth Wemochiga Soyeh 
 
May, 20 2015 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jonathan A. Wiley 
 
Major Academic Unit: Real Estate 
 
This study analyzes the cash holdings of publicly unlisted real estate investment trusts (REITs). 
Unlisted REITs have an organizational structure characterized by high equity issuance fees, 
weak governance mechanisms, finite life and distinctive periods during which there is access to 
public equity. All of these features have important implications for their corporate liquidity 
management. Using quarterly data from a sample of U.S. equity REITs spanning 1991 to 2013, 
the evidence provided in this dissertation reveals that unlisted REITs save a significant portion of 
equity offering proceeds to increase cash holdings and that these cash reserves are consistent 
with the precautionary motive for cash holdings. Specifically, it is estimated that for each 
additional dollar of new equity raised, 25 cents is accumulated as cash. The estimated amount of 
withholding for cash reserves is similar in magnitude even after empirically controlling for other 
sources of liquidity such as leverage, FFO and bank credit lines. 
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 Comparing unlisted REITs to each other, cash holdings are significantly higher during 
periods of equity access than when the offering period has expired. In fact, unlisted REITs with 
equity access hold cash balances that are 43% higher (relative to total assets) than cash balances 
after the offering period has closed. This finding is explained by the nature of the offering period 
for unlisted REITs wherein opportunities for cash accumulation are greater due to ongoing 
equity access and since FFO is less predictable during early stage operations. Further analysis 
reveals that early-stage cash accumulations are subsequently used to support investment activity.  
  Extending the comparison to include a sample of propensity score-matched listed REITs 
reveals that unlisted REITs, on average, hoard between 9% to 22% more cash (depending on 
post-offering vs. equity access) than their exchange-listed counterparts. Utilization of bank credit 
lines by unlisted REITs is 28% lower than utilization by listed REITs. The difference in cash 
holdings and credit line utilization between listed and unlisted REITs is related to lower quality 
corporate governance mechanisms and the lack of operational transparency at unlisted REITs.  
 Findings from this research should be useful to academics, policy-makers and investors 
who seek to understand the dynamics of liquidity management in firms that raise capital under 
finite-life organizational structure yet function as asset management intermediaries. Overall, the 
results imply that the increased operational risk in the unlisted REIT sector makes them more 
inclined to hold excess liquidity reserves, which consist primarily of cash. Cash provides unlisted 
REITs with self-managed insurance against liquidity shocks and offers greater financial 
flexibility when compared to banker-managed credit lines. In theory, unlisted REITs can also 
rely on internally-generated future cash flow to fund liquidity needs but its anticipated flow is 
rather unpredictable for an early-stage “blind pool” fund.  
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CHAPTER ONE―INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Background   
Empirical evidence on cash holding policies in real estate investments trusts (REITs) up to this 
point has focused exclusively on publicly exchange-listed REITs, perhaps due to broader data 
availability for listed REITs (see Hardin, Highfield, Hill, and Kelly, 2009; Ghosh, Petrova, and 
Xiao, 2012). However, unlisted REITs are becoming important investment vehicles for many 
investors. The sector has witnessed rapid growth over the last decade. The industry is reported to 
have raised approximately $84 billion in the US over the last 10 years (Hartzell and Jung-Eun, 
2012; Louis, 2013; Wiley, 2014). Kelly (2013) describes the sector as a “$10 billion-per-year” 
industry.  
Investors are attracted to the perceived diversification benefits that may be gained from 
investing in unlisted REITs and new equity has continued to flow into the sector. As the growth 
of the asset class expands, research in this under-attended sector should contribute to a better 
understanding of these investment vehicles. This dissertation aims to contribute to our 
understanding of the sector by focusing on the cash holdings of unlisted REITs.  
If the world could be characterized by frictionless capital markets (i.e., Modigliani and 
Miller, 1958), managerial finance decisions related to cash holdings are irrelevant because 
external equity is a perfect substitute for internal equity. However, in the real world, several 
factors prevent firms from operating in such an ideal situation. Some prominent culprits of 
capital market frictions include agency conflicts, informational asymmetries, transaction costs of 
raising capital, taxation and the costs of financial distress. For unlisted REITs, the preventative 
motive for accumulating cash in anticipation of any future liquidity shortfalls is likely to be of 
central importance due to high costs of equity issuance, limited access to alternative sources of 
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capital (e.g., bank credit lines) and the eminent reality that the equity fundraising period will 
experience certain closure.  
 Being an exchange-listed firm is known to enhance access to capital. Brau (2010) points 
out that an important reason why firms choose to go public is due to the improved access to 
capital markets that comes with being a listed corporation. Evidence shows that firms with 
improved access to capital markets tend to hold less cash (Keynes, 1936; Kim, Mauer, and 
Sherman, 1998; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 1999; Riddick and Whited, 2009). In 
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004), firms with greater frictions in raising outside capital 
retain a higher portion of their cash flow as cash than those without such frictions. In Brav 
(2009), the relatively high equity issuance costs associated with unlisted status causes unlisted 
firms to accumulate cash during good times and visit capital markets less frequently. Saunders 
and Steffen (2011) also posit that listed and unlisted firms differ in their levels of financial 
flexibility because unlisted firms face greater capital market frictions than listed firms, such as 
higher borrowing costs and constraints to issuing new equity.  
For unlisted REITs, equity issuance comes with sizable up-front fees and high selling 
commissions to broker-dealers. Wiley (2014) documents that the selling commission paid to 
broker-dealers is 6.8% on average, which is approximately twice the average rate of 3.08% 
reported in the mutual fund industry by Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009). He further shows that 
83.5% of unlisted REITs pay selling commission rates that are more than 6% to broker-dealers 
for new equity subscriptions.  
Beyond the equity issuance costs, another unique aspect of unlisted REITs is their finite-
life structure which causes the equity fundraising period to experience definite closure at some 
point in time. The finite-life structure is relevant to liquidity management since once access to 
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equity is no longer available the only options for financing new investment are through retained 
earnings or new debt issuance. Cash flow from operations can be positive or negative, increasing 
the need for preventative cash in anticipation of potential future liquidity shortfalls. Cash has the 
added advantage of providing unlisted REITs with flexibility in spending so they will not have to 
forgo profitable investment opportunities due to funding shortfalls. This is particularly important 
given the nature of their organizational lifecycle where a typical unlisted REIT begins by 
growing very rapidly, as illustrated in Figure 1. In Figure 1, real estate investment growth is 
shown on the left axis, while indexed values for net real estate investment and total assets are 
shown on the right. The horizontal axis is in quarters for unlisted REITs beginning four (-4) 
quarters prior to the end of the equity offering (0) and continuing for eight (8) quarters beyond 
the conclusion of the equity offering period. Figure 1 shows that asset growth stabilizes in the 
post-offering period. It also reveals that unlisted REITs experience the highest levels of real 
estate investment growth (in percentage terms) during the period when they are raising new 
equity. Unlisted REITs may be more inclined to build up cash reserves early in order to support 
the rising levels of real estate investment assets during the equity-fundraising stage.  
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Figure 1. Real estate investment activity 
 
 
Notes: The figure is based on the author’s calculations from the unlisted REITs 
sample and plots the percentage growth in net real estate investment on the left axis 
(depicted by the black line). Average values for net real estate investment scaled by 
book value of assets (depicted by the light grey bars) and total assets (depicted by 
the dark grey bars) correspond with index values on the right axis. The index takes 
on a value of one for quarter zero (0), which is the end of the equity offering 
period. Quarters are tallied relative to the end of equity access, beginning four 
quarters prior (-4) to the end of the offering (0) and continuing for eight quarters 
after (8) the offering is closed. 
 The analysis in this dissertation consists of two main sections. Using data from SNL 
Financial and hand-collected data from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
filings over the period 1991 to 2013, only unlisted REITs are examined and their cash holdings 
are compared during periods when they have access to equity to their behavior in periods when 
new equity flows are no longer available. This analysis provides insights into cash holding 
strategies as they respond to equity availability. Further, the sensitivity of cash to real estate 
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investment growth is examined. In the second section, a propensity score-matched sample is 
applied to evaluate differences in cash holdings and bank line of credit utilization between 
unlisted and listed REITs.  
 
1.1 Objectives of the Dissertation 
The objective of this dissertation is to extend the academic literature on liquidity management by 
examining a sector where investment occurs in similar assets but under the consistent REIT 
regulatory framework. The dissertation focuses on the following specific objectives: 
1. A model is estimated for the responsiveness of cash accumulation to equity issuance for 
unlisted REITs, 
2. The nature of the cash holdings for unlisted REITs is compared for periods of equity 
access versus periods when new equity is no longer available, 
3. The sensitivity of real estate investment growth to cash is estimated for unlisted REITs, 
and 
4. The differences in cash holdings and bank line of credit utilization are estimated for a 
matched sample of listed and unlisted REITs. 
 
1.2 Contribution of the Dissertation 
The manner in which firms manage their liquidity needs is an important issue in academic 
research as well as for financial managers. This dissertation examines the underlying drivers of 
cash-hoarding behavior for unlisted REITs, extending the limited body of existing literature on 
REIT liquidity management and adding to the under-explored area of research on unlisted 
REITs. Even as cash management is an understudied subject for REITs in general, cash is an 
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important item for their operations. Riddiough and Wu (2009) and Eichholtz and Yönder (2015) 
document cash to be associated with REIT investment activity. The importance of cash to REITs 
and its preservation has also captured the attention of policy makers during the financial crisis. In 
2008, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) enacted Revenue Procedure 2008-68 to allow REITs 
use elective stock dividends in lieu of cash dividends in order to preserve cash while meeting 
their distribution requirements. The specific contributions to the literature are discussed below. 
First, this dissertation estimates a model for the responsiveness of cash accumulation to 
equity issuance using a unique set of firms who not only have very high equity issuance costs, 
but also experience closure of the equity access at some point in time. The model for cash 
accumulation from equity issuance has so far only been applied to study firms that have either 
initial public offerings (IPOs) or seasoned equity offerings (e.g., Kim and Weisbach, 2008; 
McLean, 2011; Farre-Mensa, 2014).  
 Second, evidence is provided for the nature of cash holdings for firms during periods 
when they have access to equity compared to periods when equity access is unavailable. The role 
of equity access in liquidity management is previously unexamined both in the real estate and 
finance literature. The dataset uniqueness enables the differentiation between equity access and 
non-access periods under the finite-life horizon. Higher cash balances can facilitate empire-
building in periods of equity-raising (i.e., overinvest to increase firm size). Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007) consider the use of cash to engage in empire-building behavior by managers. 
Specifically, they show that excess cash provides managers with flexibility to overinvest and that 
such an inefficient level of investment tends to reduce operating performance in firms with 
agency problems. Since share prices are unobservable for unlisted firms, managerial 
compensation may be tied heavily to firm size. In Agarwal (1981), managerial compensation is 
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more closely associated with firm size than performance. Post-offering, the alignment of 
managerial incentives may shift. Issues that arise from continuous equity offerings and finite-
horizon structures are likely to impact the cash holding behavior of managers. The findings 
provided in this dissertation may prove useful to understanding liquidity management for other 
private equity firms which share similar features to unlisted REITs. An advantage of providing 
such evidence through the lens of unlisted REITs stems from the consistent regulatory structure 
which causes REITs to invest in comparable assets – the same cannot be said for other private 
equity funds.  
 Third, the dissertation contributes to the growing literature that compares the holdings of 
listed and unlisted industrial firms in general finance. In a recent study, Gao, Harford, and Li 
(2013) compare the cash holdings of private and public (non-REIT) firms and find that agency 
problems cause public firms to hold more cash than private firms. In a related study, Farre-
Mensa (2014) provides evidence to suggest that public (non-REIT) firms hold more cash than 
private firms and this is particularly true for public firms operating in industries where disclosure 
of information to competitors is detrimental. The two studies mentioned above provide 
supporting evidence that agency problems in public firms has an offsetting effect on the financial 
frictions argument for cash holdings in firms with less access to capital markets (e.g., Keynes, 
1936; Kim, Mauer, and Sherman, 1998; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 1999; 
Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Brav, 2009). Unlike non-REIT public firms, however, 
exchange-traded REITs generally do not suffer greater agency problems. Ghosh, Petrova, and 
Xiao (2012) hypothesize that the institutional clientele effect in REITs and their higher dividend 
payout reduce agency problems. Bauer, Eichholtz, and Kok (2010) conjecture that the regulated 
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structure of exchange-traded REITs prevents agency conflicts. The offsetting effect of lower 
agency problems for listed REITs is not expected to be relevant for the unlisted REIT sample. 
 Finally, comparing cash holdings and bank credit utilization between listed and unlisted 
REITs should provide insights into the relative operating risk of the two sectors. Acharya, 
Almeida, and Campello (2013) find that firms with higher aggregate risk discover that bank 
credit lines are very costly and prefer instead to use cash holdings to meet their liquidity needs. 
Similarly, Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito, and Perez (2014) demonstrate both theoretically and 
empirically that firms with liquidity risk manage their corporate liquidity with cash as opposed to 
bank credit lines in order to avoid monitoring by lenders. Examining a set of firms that recently 
had their bond ratings downgraded, the authors’ document an increase in cash holdings following 
the heightened liquidity risk signaled. Sufi (2009) documents that firms with riskier cash flows 
prefer to use cash for liquidity management rather than bank credit lines because such firms are 
more susceptible to covenant violation and the subsequent revocation of the credit line. 
Haushalter, Klasa, and Maxwell (2007) show that cash holdings are positively associated with 
predation risk. Arena and Julio (2011) find a positive relationship between litigation risk and 
cash holdings. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) posit that firms with riskier cash 
flows stockpile more cash. Thus, less transparent firms and those with incentives to veil financial 
health assessments should have a strong preference for using cash over bank lines of credit for 
liquidity needs. 
 
1.3 Organization of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter Two provides the conceptual 
framework for the dissertation, reviewing current and past literature on cash holdings, expanding 
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on the motivation for the study and developing the testable hypotheses. Chapter Three covers the 
description of the data and the methodology used. Chapter Four discusses the empirical results 
related to each section of the analysis. The final chapter, Chapter Five, offers the concluding 
remarks.  
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CHAPTER TWO―LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Theories of Cash Holdings 
Theories have evolved to explain why firms hold some of their assets in cash. Prominent 
explanations include the agency motive, the precautionary motive, the transaction motive, 
speculative motive and the tax motive. In Jensen’s (1986) agency model, managers who are 
entrenched will accumulate cash for their own interests rather than distribute to shareholders, 
even when investment prospects are poor. For Keynes (1936), the precautionary motive should 
stimulate the need for holding cash as safety stocks when access to external markets is costly. 
The transaction costs motive is developed by Baumol (1952) and Miller and Orr (1966) where 
larger firms are expected to hold less cash than smaller firms since economics of scale can 
reduce the transaction costs involved in raising funds externally for larger firms. In Ross, 
Westerfield, and Jordan (2008: 613), the speculative motive for holding cash makes it possible 
for firms to hoard cash in order to take advantage of unexpected opportunities. There may also 
be tax consequences from holding cash, such as those for foreign earnings at multinational firms, 
impacting the optimal cash balance (Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite, 2007).  
Empirical work has tested many of these theories, with some studies devoted to studying 
the determinants of cash policies and others providing evidence on the implications of cash 
balances. Section 2.1 outlines evidence in support of the respective motives, providing a 
framework for identifying relevant measures to be considered in the empirical analysis. Section 
2.2 looks at cash savings from equity proceeds. Section 2.3 highlights some important 
consequences from the level of cash holdings documented in the existing literature. The 
relevance of each possible motive for public unlisted REITs is discussed in Section 2.4. 
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2.1 Determinants of Cash Holdings 
2.1.1 Agency Costs 
Corporate governance, institutions and labor unionization have each been noted to have a 
significant effect on the levels of cash holdings. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) observe in a sample of 
UK corporations that firms with closely-held controllers tend to hold more cash than widely-held 
corporations. Providing international evidence, Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003) find 
that firms operating in countries with poor shareholder protection tend to accumulate more cash. 
Similarly using international evidence, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) find that 
corporate governance has an effect on firms’ cash holdings.  
Cash holdings are related to the quality of institutions and capital market development 
within the respective country. Kalcheva and Lins (2007) use data from over 5,000 firms and 31 
countries to provide some evidence that corporations which have controlling managers tend to 
hoard greater amounts of cash. The relationship strengthens when firm-level agency problems 
are interacted with country-level proxies for weak shareholder protection. Cash holdings are 
highest at firms with controlling managers in countries where shareholder protection is very 
weak.  
Using U.S. data, Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) document an inverse relationship 
between corporate governance and the level of cash holdings. In contrast to the evidence 
documented in Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003), Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 
(2006) and Kalcheva and Lins (2007), they find that poor shareholder rights are closely related to 
low cash holdings. In the labor rights area, Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina (2009) find that 
cash holdings are inversely associated with unionization – higher cash at corporations where 
managers seek greater bargaining power over unions.  
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 All of these studies are based on samples of non-REIT firms. This dissertation 
investigates how firm-level agency issues in unlisted REITs may impact on their cash holdings. 
Unlisted REITs are largely externally-advised creating potential conflict of interest problems for 
managers. In addition, one advisory firm can be an advisor to several unlisted REIT firms which 
further exacerbates conflict of interest problems. Hardin, Highfield, Hill, and Kelly (2009) 
provide evidence that externally-advised listed REITs have higher cash holdings than their 
internally-advised counterparts. Aside from the externally-advised structure, unlisted REITs 
typically do not have dominant shareholders such as institutional investors which reduces 
monitoring and analyst coverage that often accompanies such investors.  
2.1.2 Precautionary Reserves 
Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2007) and Denis and Sibilkov (2009) examine hedging and 
cash holdings. Hedging is an important issue for firms with cash flow volatility who wish to 
avoid situations where the capital markets need to be tapped whenever there is a shortfall in cash 
flow, such as occurs under a margin call. Firms with extensive hedging activity tend to hold 
higher levels of cash. 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) show that cash holdings reduce the probability of financial 
distress from unexpected losses. The authors contend that in times of financial distress, firms 
with stockpiles of cash will be in a better position to fund investment. This assertion is supported 
in an earlier study by John (1993). Using a sample of 223 firms, he notes that firms susceptible to 
financial distress tend to accumulate cash. The author identifies financial distress using firms 
with higher market-to-book ratios and lower tangible assets.  
There is some overlap between evidence for precautionary and transactional motives, 
particularly as it relates to the use of leverage in the capital structure. High levels of debt increase 
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financial risk and also increase the transactional costs associated with raising external capital. 
For instance, Denis and Sibilkov (2009) reveal that firms with poor or no bond ratings and firms 
operating in sectors where cash flow volatility is high will accumulate excess cash. Bond rating 
is used as a proxy for financial strength. Hence, firms with bad ratings will have the weakest 
financial position in terms of raising money and are expected to hold more cash.  
Similarly, Guney, Ozkan, and Ozkan (2007) document a positive association between 
cash and leverage. Higher leverage can lead to financial distress and the possibility of 
bankruptcy. Firms may be inclined to hoard cash in order to reduce their vulnerability to 
financial distress and costly bankruptcy. In support of this view, Gamba and Triantis (2008) also 
report that predominantly firms which use higher debt financing are the ones concurrently 
holding greater cash reserves. 
The precautionary need to accumulate cash for unlisted REITs should be high due to the 
fact that they have a predetermined period to raise external equity after which they can only rely 
on debt and internally-generated cash flow to meet their liquidity needs. However, given the 
relatively nontransparent nature of unlisted REITs, debt can be costly to issue and cash flow 
from operations may be unpredictable. 
2.1.3 Transactional Costs of External Finance 
Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998), Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) and Ozkan 
and Ozkan (2004) all report that cash holdings are inversely related to the amount of financial 
leverage used. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) argue that firms with higher debt 
ratios tend to accumulate less cash. For a firm that is able to accumulate sufficient cash, demand 
for debt is lower. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) point out that firms increase cash levels in order to 
internally finance investments when the costs of external funds are very high. Ferreira and Vilela 
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(2004) also provide evidence in support of an inverse relation between leverage and the amount 
of cash holdings. The authors state that firms with higher leverage are usually closely monitored 
by their lenders when compared to firms with relatively low leverage. The higher monitoring 
may deter firms from stockpiling cash. This inverse relation between cash holdings and leverage 
implies that firms use debt as a substitute for holding cash (John, 1993). Since higher debt ratios 
can indicate ease of access to debt markets, firms that are highly leveraged may have lesser need 
to accumulate cash. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) argue the debt settlement perspective, stating 
that debt payments reduce a firm’s ability to hoard cash. This suggests an expected inverse 
relationship between cash holdings and the amount of leverage used in the capital structure.  
Cash holdings can be more valuable when other sources of capital, such as retained 
earnings, are inadequate to augment firms’ need for finance. Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach 
(2004) examine whether costly external finance affects cash holding policies of firms. Sorting 
firms into financially-constrained and unconstrained firms, they find that financially-constrained 
firms have a greater propensity to save cash. In their analysis, constrained firms save cash out of 
cash flows while unconstrained firms do not. In Han and Qiu (2007), cash holdings of 
constrained firms increased with cash flow volatility between 1998 and 2002.  
Another form of internal finance occurs through asset sales. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) 
provide evidence on the sale of assets as a means of finance for firms and discuss the impact that 
might have on cash holdings. Firms with liquid assets that can easily and cheaply be converted 
into cash will raise funds through asset sales when other sources of finance are expensive. 
Diversified firms are more likely than undiversified firms to have significant liquid assets 
available that can easily and cheaply be converted into cash, thus diversified firms can afford to 
hoard less cash. Similarly, economies of scale should affect cash holdings. Fazzari and Petersen 
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(1993) find that small firms face higher external financing costs than larger firms, thus there is an 
inverse relationship between firm size and cash holdings. Vogel and Maddala (1967) document 
that small firms tend to have higher cash-to-assets ratios than larger firms.  
The substitutability of cash for financing suggests an inverse relationship when 
alternative sources of capital are readily available and at a low cost. For instance, Mulligan 
(1997) finds that cash holdings are reduced when there is an increase in current sales revenue. 
Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) argue that 
dividend-paying firms should hold less cash because they can raise money cheaply by cutting 
dividends.  
The transactional cost of external finance is highly relevant for REITs. Ott, Riddiough, 
and Yi (2005) provide evidence that unlike non-REIT firms which financed 70% of their 
investment from retained earnings, 84% of aggregate investment by listed REITs over their study 
period was funded from equity and long-term debt. The remaining 16% was financed from 
retained earnings, preferred stock and short-term debt. Listed REITs have the ability to visit the 
external capital markets frequently to raise funds due to lower external financing costs (Ghosh 
and Sun, 2014). In contrast to listed REITs, the cost of external finance for unlisted REITs is 
high. Wiley (2014) finds that the rate of selling commission paid to broker-dealers is about 6.8%. 
The transaction cost of raising external capital suggests that higher cash ratios should be more 
valuable to unlisted REITs where the cost of raising equity is relatively high.  
2.1.4 Speculative Opportunities 
Through investigating the cross-sectional determinants of cash holdings, Kim, Mauer, and 
Sherman (1998) and Harford (1999) provide evidence that cash holdings are positively 
associated with a firm’s growth opportunities. This strategy provides firms with flexibility so that 
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they will not have to forgo profitable investment opportunities due to shortage of funds. The 
most common proxies for investment opportunities in the literature include market-to-book ratio, 
research and development expenditures, changes in assets and sales growth.  
A caveat to the positive relationship implied between growth opportunities and cash 
hoarding is for firms with relatively strong cash flow. Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) argue 
that cash flow serves as a ready source of finance for investment and debt settlements. As a 
result, the risk of having to forgo investment opportunities and becoming financially distressed is 
reduced for firms with higher cash flow streams. Consequently, firms with higher cash flows can 
afford to accumulate less cash. In a contrasting view, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 
(1999) find a direct positive relation between cash and cash flow. This positive relation implies 
that firms tend to maintain higher cash levels from internally-generated funds. The hypothesized 
direct positive relationship between cash flow and cash is aligned with Myers and Majluf’s 
(1984) assertion of asymmetric information causing firms to have a preference for internal over 
external equity. Jensen’s (1986) agency theory also predicts cash holdings to be greater for firms 
with high free cash flow. 
The literature on speculative opportunities has implications for unlisted REITs because 
they often raise equity through a blind-pool offering, similar to most private equity funds where 
investors do not have prior knowledge about the assets to be acquired before committing their 
capital. Building up cash reserves in order to handle unexpected future investment opportunities 
should be an important issue for unlisted REITs. Riddiough and Wu (2009) argue that listed 
REITs have investment rates that are sometimes higher than non-REIT firms. They show that 
bank credit lines are useful in supporting higher investment activity at listed REITs because they 
are able to easily draw on credit lines when investment opportunities arise. However, unlisted 
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REITs may be constrained in the use of bank credit lines to fund investment opportunities due to 
weak corporate governance and lack of transparency, thus cash reserves should be expected to 
play a major role in funding investment activity.  
 
2.2 Empirical Evidence on Cash Savings from Equity Proceeds 
Kim and Weisbach (2008) find that the largest use of initial public offering (IPO) and seasoned 
equity offering (SEO) proceeds is cash savings. They estimate that for every dollar raised in an 
IPO approximately 49 cents is held as cash in the subsequent year. They contend that the high 
cash savings could be the result of firms issuing new equity when their stock is highly mispriced 
although the money may not be immediately required to fund new investments. Similarly, Farre-
Mensa (2014) argues that the high cash savings from equity issuance could be explained by the 
market timing behavior of firms. Comparing public and private firms, the author shows that 
public firms save a larger proportion of their equity proceeds as cash. The cash increases from 
equity issuance are particularly large for public firms where managers believe the stock is 
overvalued. New equity proceeds are stored as cash in order to mitigate the risk of needing to 
raise equity at a time when the stock may be undervalued.  
 McLean (2011) identifies an increasing trend over time in the strategy to reserve cash 
following equity issuance. Using data from 1971 to 2008, the author shows that the proportion of 
equity proceeds saved as cash grew at an average annual rate of 2.5%. McLean (2011) argues 
that increasing precautionary cash holdings is a better explanation for cash savings from equity 
issuance, rather than the market timing explanations of Kim and Weisback (2008) and Farre-
Mensa (2014).  
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 All studies mentioned in this section examine firms with both IPOs and SEOs. Yet, what 
is the nature of cash savings from equity proceeds in firms that do not have the ability to conduct 
secondary equity offerings? Unlisted REITs are structured as finite-life entities with continuous 
equity offerings that experience certain closure. The equity offering period ranges between one 
to three years with the possibility for extension. Once the offering period is closed, unlisted 
REITs no longer have the ability to tap the secondary equity markets for additional funds.  
 
2.3 Implications of Cash Holdings 
The extant literature shows that cash holdings are impacted by a number of factors including 
agency problems, cost of raising external finance, the need to fulfill speculative needs and the 
need for financial reserves to provide surplus capital stock for when funds are needed. This 
section provides evidence on implications from holding excessive amounts of cash. 
Beyond cash holding determinants and cash savings from equity issuance, a number of 
studies have examined the implications of cash holdings. The empirical findings are mixed as to 
whether high cash holdings are generally better or worse for a firm. While some studies find 
holding more cash to be value-enhancing (Mikkelson and Partch, 2003; Pinkowitz and 
Williamson, 2003; Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Denis and Sibilkov, 2009), others provide 
evidence that higher cash levels may be value-decreasing (Harford, 1999; Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2006; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008).  
Mikkelson and Partch (2003) assert that higher cash holdings do not necessarily reduce 
value and may be necessary for the successful operation of a firm. Using a matched sample of 
firms based on size and industry, they show that operating performance of firms with larger cash 
balances is enhanced relative those with smaller cash accounts. Operating performance of cash 
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rich firms is unrelated to proxies for managerial incentives such as proportion of stock ownership 
by insiders, the percentage of insiders on the board of directors, founder status and the proportion 
of shares held by institutional investors.  
Denis and Sibilkov (2009) argue that higher cash balances are valuable to managers of 
financially-constrained firms. They show that high cash reserves allow financially-constrained 
firms to participate in value-enhancing investment. An earlier study by Faulkender and Wang 
(2006) also establishes that the marginal value of cash is greater for financially-constrained 
firms, especially when the firm has favorable investment opportunities. Similarly, Pinkowitz and 
Williamson (2003) find that the value of cash holdings is greater for firms with higher 
investment opportunities. In Gamba and Triantis (2008), cash provides a firm with valuable 
financial flexibility. For Harford (1999), cash holdings are only valuable when the opportunity 
cost of underinvesting is very high.  
Baskin (1987) and Fresard (2010) view the value of cash holdings in light of competition 
from rival firms. In Fresard’s estimation, firms that are cash-rich rely on their cash balances to 
increase investment in plants and equipment, develop excellent distribution networks, out-
advertise rivals and employ a more productive work force. After accounting for endogeneity in 
the analyses, Fresard documents that cash-rich firms have an enhanced ability to expand their 
future market share at the detriment of their rivals. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase 
in cash holdings for cash-rich industrial firms, relative to their rivals, provides them with a 2.9% 
increase in their product market share for the subsequent two years. Baskin (1987) also 
hypothesizes that firms use cash holdings for competitive purposes and applies a theoretical 
model to demonstrate how firms use cash to retaliate against encroachment from competitors on 
investment opportunities.  
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 In contrast to the value-enhancing perspectives on cash holdings, some studies have 
viewed cash holdings as a source of managerial agency problems. Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (1994) examine a small sample of firms that received cash windfalls from lawsuits 
and find that such windfalls were inefficiently spent. Harford (1999) studies acquisitions by 
firms with large cash reserves at a particular point in time and documents that managers with 
misaligned incentives to maximize firm value tend to spend those large reserves on value-
decreasing acquisitions. Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) report that cash-rich firms with 
weak corporate governance coupled with poor shareholder rights spend their cash more quickly 
through capital expenditures and acquisitions with negative repercussions to firm value. Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that firms with larger cash reserves but weak corporate governance 
usually spend their reserves in ways that reduce operating performance. They estimate that $1 
worth of cash is only valued at about $0.42 to $0.88 for poorly-governed firms. In a related 
study, Lins and Kalcheva (2007) use data on more than 5,000 firms from 31 countries to show 
that cash holdings are more negatively related to firm value when managerial control is very 
strong and shareholder protection is weak. Similarly, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006) 
employ a sample representing 35 countries over an 11-year period and document that $1 of cash 
assets in countries with poor shareholder protection is valued at $0.33 by investors.  
Examining the implications of cash holdings in listed REITs, Ghosh, Petrova, and Xiao 
(2012) find that cash-rich, publicly-listed REITs do not engage in value-decreasing acquisitions. 
Thus, findings for excessive cash holdings in REITs are at odds with evidence documented for 
non-REITs firms. The authors attribute this finding to the lack of serious agency problems in 
exchange-listed REITs. Eichholtz and Yönder (2015) document a positive association between 
cash holdings of listed REITs and their investment growth. This dissertation contributes to the 
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literature on consequences from excessive cash by considering whether high quantities of cash 
holdings have an impact on real estate investment growth at unlisted REITs. 
  
2.4 Hypotheses Development 
Review of the literature outlines that corporate liquidity management is associated with a number 
of variables including firm size, leverage, cash flow, cash flow volatility, corporate governance 
and country-level institutions but with mixed evidence on the specific implications from the level 
of cash holdings to outcomes. It is established that firms often elect to accumulate cash from 
equity proceeds. Unlike the parent literature on cash holdings, however, REIT cash holdings 
have received very limited attention. Hardin, Highfield, Hill, and Kelly (2009) made the first 
attempt to contribute to the cash holdings literature on listed REITs by investigating the 
determinants of their cash holdings. Ghosh, Petrova, and Xiao (2012) moved beyond the 
determinants of listed REIT cash holdings by examining the effect of excess cash reserves on 
acquisitions. This dissertation builds on these studies to help fill the void on REIT cash holdings. 
Higher dividend payments in REITs may lower retained earnings and reduce free cash 
flow available to managers (Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu, 2010). The mandatory 90% dividend 
payout does not, however, entirely prevent listed REITs from having discretionary income. 
Studies by Bauer, Eichholtz, and Kok (2010) and Hardin, Highfield, Hill, and Kelly (2009) posit 
that the payout is only applicable to taxable income, excluding depreciation (which is a non-cash 
expense), and does not reduce a firm’s cash flow. In Bradley, Capozza, and Seguin (1998), the 
dividend distribution requirement for REITs is not typically a binding constraint for discretionary 
income. They show that dividend payouts, on average, are twice the magnitude of taxable 
income in their sample. They explain this result from the difference between net income and cash 
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flow for REITs, where depreciation is a large non-cash expense item. Listed REIT firms have 
discretion to decide how to use cash flow in excess of net income. Hardin and Hill (2008) 
document that listed REITs dividend distributions over and above the 90% mandatory 
requirement are related to lower agency costs, the existence of a stock repurchase program, 
accessibility to short-term debt and higher operating performance. It is evident from these studies 
that the high dividend payout of REITs may not necessarily shield them from a possible free cash 
flow problem and cash accumulation. As mentioned earlier, listed REITs were given the option 
during the financial crisis to use elective stock dividends in lieu of cash dividends in meeting 
distribution requirements in order to preserve cash. In addition, early termination of leases 
creates lump sum payments of future rents which can add to REIT cash accounts.  
2.4.1 Hypotheses  
Firms with financial frictions demonstrate a precautionary motive for holding cash (Keynes, 
1936; Baumol, 1952; Miller and Orr, 1966; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009; Gao, Harford, and Li, 
2013). Financial frictions at unlisted REITs stem from their high cost of equity issuance and 
limited access to debt markets – a consequence of their finite-life structure. McLean (2011) 
argues that firms can increase their precautionary cash holdings by saving a portion of new 
equity proceeds. The propensity to save cash from new equity proceeds is extended to a set of 
firms that have very high equity issuance costs and a limited window within which to issue new 
equity. Hypothesis 1 (H1) for the expected retention of cash from equity proceeds is stated 
below. 
H1: Unlisted REITs are expected to allocate a fraction of their equity proceeds into their cash 
balances.  
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Continuing with the precautionary motive, unlisted REITs are expected to have lower 
precautionary demands for cash during equity access compared to the period when equity is 
unavailable. This occurs as managers enjoy a continuous stream of cash flow from new equity 
investors during the equity offering. In isolation, this issue would cause unlisted REITs to hold 
less cash when they are actively raising new equity than they would when they are no longer 
raising equity. On the other hand, if higher amounts of cash can be accumulated from equity 
proceeds (Hypothesis 1), then cash holdings will be higher during equity access. Another factor 
is that during period of equity access, unlisted REITs are experiencing rapid growth (depicted in 
Figure 1) and cash flows from operations may be volatile which further increases the need to 
have higher precautionary cash holdings. Hypothesis 2 (H2) comparing expected changes in cash 
holdings around the offering period for unlisted REITs is stated below.  
H2: Unlisted REITs are expected to hold more cash during the equity-raising period than during 
the post-offering period.  
The countervailing effect from an inability to access equity in the post-offering period may cause 
unlisted REITs to maintain higher cash accounts. If factors related to the precautionary motive 
become more dominant during the non-raising period, then H2 is likely to be rejected and 
unlisted REITs will actually be found to hold more cash following the offering period. 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) argue that cash holdings are more valuable for financially-
constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. Given the established liquidity constraints in 
unlisted REITs (Wiley, 2014), available cash should be valuable for real estate investment 
growth. Eichholtz and Yönder (2015) and Riddiough and Wu (2009) show that cash is positively 
related to real estate investment activity in listed REITs. Hypothesis 3 (H3) for the expected 
relationship between cash holdings and real estate investment growth is stated below. 
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H3: Cash holdings in unlisted REIT are expected to be positively related to future real estate 
investment growth.  
Francis, Lys, and Vincent (2004) show that, between 1992 and 1997, listed REITs 
accessed the equity market more frequently than other non-REIT firms. This frequenting of the 
equity market is possible because listed REITs have lower external financing costs (Ghosh and 
Sun, 2014). Information asymmetry problems typically associated with new equity issues are 
mitigated by the fact that exchange-listed REITs have lower agency problems when compared to 
other firms (Hardin and Hill, 2008; Ghosh, Petrova, and Xiao, 2012). In Hardin and Hill (2008), 
reducing agency problems is one of the reasons why REITs pay excess dividends. Hardin, 
Highfield, Hill, and Kelly (2009) assert that listed REITs may choose not to accumulate too 
much cash in order to reduce associated agency conflicts thereby enhancing transparency and 
reducing costs of external financing. In contrast to listed REITs, however, unlisted REITs have 
higher cost of equity issuance and agency problems are more severe due to their externally-
advised structure
1
 and lack of transparency. Green and Rhea (2013) describe the nontransparent 
nature of unlisted REITs: “Non-traded REITs also must comply with all SEC disclosure 
regulations, but many do not host quarterly earnings release calls. There are additional 
regulations and requirements of exchanges that non-traded REITs also avoid” (p.2). Hypothesis 4 
(H4) comparing expected cash holdings at listed and unlisted REITs is stated below.  
H4: Unlisted REITs are expected to carry higher cash balance than their exchange-listed REIT 
counterparts.  
Beyond the strict definition of cash reserves, are unlisted REITs able to draw on 
available lines of credit as an alternative source of liquidity management? Sufi (2009) finds that 
                                                     
1
 See Capozza and Seguin 2000 for further discussion on REIT advisor structure and agency issues. 
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corporations use cash and bank lines of credit jointly to cope with liquidity risk. He argues that 
the two are not perfect substitutes. Unlike cash, bank credit lines have protective covenants 
which require firms to demonstrate sufficient cash flow streams prior to drawing on the credit 
line. In Yun (2009), agency costs cause cash and lines of credit to not function as perfect 
substitutes. Firms with agency problems naturally prefer to accumulate unmonitored cash instead 
of credit lines, which can be monitored. The author documents that cash holdings are higher for 
firms without large shareholders such as institutional investors. Acharya, Almeida, Ippolito, and 
Perez (2014) describe a bank credit line as “monitored liquidity insurance” from lenders subject 
to revocation. An, Hardin, and Wu (2012) show in listed REITs that less transparent firms and 
those with information asymmetry problems are less inclined to rely on lines of credit for 
liquidity needs. Hypothesis (H5) considers the relevance of reduced transparency for unlisted 
REITs extended to bank lines of credit, stated below. 
H5: Unlisted REITs are expected to have less reliance on bank lines of credit as an alternative 
source of liquidity compared to their listed REIT counterparts.  
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CHAPTER THREE―DATA AND MEHODOLOGY 
3.0 Data 
The contribution of this dissertation is in the evaluation of cash holding policies for unlisted 
REITs. Unlisted REITs bear similar characteristic to listed REITs. They typically hold income-
producing properties in a portfolio and must have a minimum of 100 shareholders. No fewer than 
five shareholders may collectively hold more than 50% of the shares outstanding. As a REIT, 
they must distribute 90% of their taxable income as dividends. Corgel and Gibson (2008) report 
unlisted REITs dividend payout ratios are greater than 100% of FFO, compared to an average 
payout ratio for listed REITs at 70% of FFO. Return of capital occurs primarily through either a 
share redemption program or a fund exit. Unlike listed REITs however, unlisted REITs face 
higher costs of equity issuance, they have a finite-life structure that causes equity access to 
expire, they generally lack analyst coverage and have overall reduced transparency.  
 Data for the analysis is collected from SNL Financial – a popular data source for the 
REIT sector. SNL data for unlisted REITs is complemented with hand-collected data from SEC 
filings. The data cleaning requires several steps including: deleting observations with missing 
values for the variables of interest, deleting non-U.S. firms and removing firms which have no 
assets under management (i.e., where total assets equals cash). Furthermore, observations where 
net income is greater than total revenue are deleted and observations where total liabilities are 
greater than total assets are deleted. All firms are required to have achieved official REIT tax 
status in order to be included in the sample. Any non-equity REITs are eliminated from the 
analysis.  
 The data trimming leaves 1,428 and 7,994 observations for unlisted REITs and listed 
REITs respectively, with the sample period spanning from the fourth quarter of 1991 thru the 
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first quarter of 2013. There are 79 unique unlisted REIT firms and 150 unique listed REITs in the 
sample as of the first quarter in 2013. Observations are in firm-quarters and firms with less than 
two quarters of data available are excluded from the panel. All continuous variables are 
Winsorized at the 2
nd
 and 98
th
 percentiles to reduce the influence of outliers. Table 1 below 
defines the variables used in the analysis.  
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Table 1. Description of variables  
 
Variable Name Description 
Age  Age of the firm in quarters, measured relative to the first quarter of data availability 
Assets Book value of total assets 
Cash  Cash and equivalents, scaled by Assets 
ΔCash Quarterly change in Cash, scaled by Assets 
FFO Operating income plus depreciation and amortization (excluding gains or losses from property sales), 
scaled by Revenue 
I{Equity raising} Indicator variable for equity-raising unlisted REITs 
I{Internally advised} Indicator variable for internally-advised firms 
I{Unlisted REIT} Indicator variable for unlisted REITs 
Leverage Total liabilities, scaled by Assets 
LOC available Bank credit lines available, scaled by Assets 
LOC drawn Bank credit lines drawn 
LOC used Bank credit lines drawn, scaled by LOC available 
Proceeds Quarterly proceeds from new equity issues (under cash flows from financing), scaled by Assets 
RE investment Total real estate investment (net of depreciation), scaled by Assets 
RE investment growth Quarterly percentage change in net real estate investment  
Revenue Quarterly gross revenue  
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3.1 Methodology 
This section begins with outlining the methodology used to analyze the unlisted REIT sample 
and concludes with development of the empirical strategy for drawing a comparison to liquidity 
management at exchange-listed REITs. 
3.1.1 Unlisted REITs 
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 considers cash savings from equity issuance. This hypothesis predicts a positive 
association between ΔCash and equity proceeds. A positive sign suggests that a fraction of equity 
proceeds is allocated to cash reserves. In McLean (2011) and Farre-Mensa (2014), firms are 
observed to raise external equity during times when issuance costs are low and save most of the 
proceeds as cash to avoid issuing new equity during periods of high cost to equity issuance. For 
unlisted REITs, equity issuance is always very costly in terms of high front-end loads and selling 
commissions to broker-dealers, but cash savings from equity issuance is made necessary due to 
the scarcity of equity access created under the finite-life organizational structure. Since the 
equity fundraising period experiences definite closure at some point in time, managers need to 
stockpile preventative cash in anticipation of any future cash shortfalls. The cash savings model 
used by McLean (2011) and Farre-Mensa (2014) estimates the change in cash from the previous 
period as a function of equity proceeds, debt proceeds, cash flow from operations, other sources 
of funds and assets. A modified version of the model is adopted here for unlisted REITs as 
follows: 
(1)  ΔCashit = β0 + β1 Proceedsit-1 + β2 Leverageit-1 + β3 LOC availableit-1+ β4 FFOit-1 
+ β5 ln(Assetsit-1) + β6 Ageit + Σβj Pj + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
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 The dependent variable in Equation (1) is change in cash and equivalents from quarter to 
quarter scaled by book value of assets, ΔCash. Equation (1) includes a term for quarterly new 
equity proceeds, Proceeds, which is the variable of interest. New equity proceeds are 
unobtainable in SNL Financial and were hand-collected from individual 10-K and 10-Q filings in 
the SEC Edgar database for each firm in the sample. New equity proceeds are calculated after 
netting out issuance costs and dividend reinvestment proceeds. Leverage equals total liabilities 
scaled by book value of assets. LOC available is bank credit lines available scaled by Assets. 
FFO is funds from operations scaled by total revenue. ln(Assets) is included to proxy firm size. 
The variables Proceeds, Leverage, LOC available, FFO, and ln(Assets) are each lagged one 
quarter. 
 Leverage, LOC available and FFO are included to capture the impact from other sources 
of capital on cash accumulation from equity proceeds. Cash can also be saved from debt 
proceeds and internal cash flow (FFO) thereby reducing the amount of cash needing to be 
accumulated from equity proceeds. The availability of bank credit lines may decrease the need to 
stockpile cash from equity proceeds. Age, or firm age in quarters, is also included to capture the 
maturity of the firm, calculated relative to the first quarter of available data for the firm. Older 
firms may be well established and have better access to other sources of capital reducing the 
need to accumulate higher cash reserves. Five property-type indicator variables (P) and 72 
calendar-quarter indicator variables (Q) are also included in the model to control fixed-effects. 
Industrial and self-storage property types are categorized together and suppressed in the analysis. 
The last parameter in Equation (1) is the disturbance term. The subscripts i and t represent firm 
and quarter respectively. The sample in used in Equation (1) covers only the equity-raising 
period for unlisted REITs. 
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Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 considers differences in cash holdings between unlisted REITs that are equity-
raising versus non-raising. The expectation under this hypothesis is that unlisted REITs with 
access to equity should have higher cash holdings. A positive sign on the variable of interest, 
I{Equity raising}, in Equation (2) will support the hypothesized relationship. The equation used 
to test the differences in the cash holdings is analogous to the model developed by Hardin, 
Highfield, Hill, and Kelly (2009) for determinants of REIT cash holdings.  
(2)  Cashit = β0 + β1 I{Equity raisingit} + β2 ln(Assetsit) + β3 Leverageit + β4 FFOit 
+ β5 I{Internally advisedit} + β6 LOC availableit  
+ β7 I{Equity raisingit}*ln(Assetsit) + β8 I{Equity raisingit}*Leverageit  
+ β9 I{Equity raisingit}*FFOit 
+ β10 I{Equity raisingit}*I{Internally advisedit}  
+ β11 I{Equity raisingit}*LOC availableit + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
The dependent variable, Cash, is total cash and cash equivalents scaled by book value of 
total assets. I{Internally advised} is an indicator variable taking on a value of one during 
quarters for which the fund is self-advised and zero otherwise. LOC available is bank credit lines 
available divided by book value of assets. The variable of interest, I{Equity raising}, is an 
indicator variable and takes the value of one if the unlisted REIT firm has access to equity during 
the quarter and zero otherwise.  
FFO and ln(Assets) capture the precautionary and transaction cost of raising external 
finance explanations for cash holdings. Larger firms, proxied by ln(Assets), enjoy lower of cost 
of raising funds externally due to scale of economics and should correspondingly hoard less 
cash. Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) and Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (1999) find 
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a negative relation between cash and firm size in financial firms. Similarly, Hardin, Highfield, 
Hill, and Kelly (2009) and Ghosh, Petrova, and Xiao (2012) document a negative relation 
between size and cash for listed REIT firms. Firms with higher internal cash (FFO) flow should 
have lower precautionary need to accumulate more cash because they can rely on cash flow to 
satisfy liquidity needs. Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) argue that cash flow serves as a ready 
source of finance for investment and debt settlements. As a result, the risk of having to forgo 
investment opportunities and becoming financially distressed is reduced for firms with higher 
cash flow streams. Consequently, firms with higher cash flows can afford to hold lower cash 
balances. Hardin, Highfield, Hill, and Kelly (2009) and Ghosh, Petrova, and Xiao (2012) also 
show a negative relation between cash flow (FFO) and cash for listed REIT firms. They argue 
that REITs may prefer not to accumulate cash from cash flow in order to increase transparency 
and hence benefit from lower external financing costs. Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 
(1999), however, find a direct positive relation between cash and cash flow in non-REIT firms. 
This positive relation implies that firms tend to maintain higher cash levels from internally-
generated funds. 
Leverage and LOC available are noted in the literature to capture the impact of 
monitoring and control of agency problems on cash holdings. For instance, Ferreira and Vilela 
(2004) posit that firms with higher leverage are usually closely monitored by their lenders when 
compared to firms with relatively low leverage. The higher monitoring may prevent firms from 
stockpiling cash. Ghosh, Petrova, and Xiao (2012) and Hardin, Highfield, Hill, and Kelly (2009) 
document leverage to be negatively associated with cash holdings in listed REITs; attributing 
this to the fact that higher leverage can be a disciplinary mechanism to reduce free cash flow 
available to managers. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) look at the negative relation between cash 
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holdings and leverage from a debt settlement perspective, arguing that debt payments reduce a 
firm’s ability to hoard cash. Hardin, Highfield, Hill, and Kelly (2009) argue that I{Internally 
advised}, a REIT specific variable, captures agency problems. An internally-advised REIT 
structure is argued to have fewer agency problems and should hold lower amounts of cash.  
 I{Equity raising} is interacted with each of these cash holding control variables in the 
Equation. Equation (2) also has 81 calendar-quarter indicator variables (Q) to control fixed 
effects. The subscripts i and t represent the firm and quarter, respectively. The last parameter in 
Equation (2) is the disturbance term. All variables are clearly defined in Table 1. 
Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 looks at the impact of cash on real estate investment growth of unlisted REITs. 
Since capital availability should impact a firm’s ability to invest, a positive relationship is 
expected between cash and future real investment growth. The baseline investment model is 
expressed as: 
(3)  RE investment growthit = β0 + β1 ln(Cashit-1) + β2 ln(Assetsit-1) + β3 Leverageit-1   
+ β4 FFOit-1 + β5 LOC usedit-1 + Σβj Pj + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
The dependent variable is RE investment growth from quarter to quarter provided by SNL 
Financial. Eichholtz and Yönder (2015) use a similar dependent variable to proxy for real estate 
investment activity in listed REITs. RE investment growth is expressed in percentage terms in 
SNL Financial (SNL item #132052). It is scaled by 100 in this analysis in order to reduce the 
magnitude of the coefficients of the independent variables in the regression and to facilitate 
easier interpretation. The Cash and Proceeds variables have also been logged for the same 
reason in Equation (3). Proceeds is included as a control because Brown and Riddiough (2003) 
suggest that the most common use of equity proceeds by listed REITs is to finance new 
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investment. Other control variables in Equation (3) are ln(Assets), Leverage, LOC used and FFO. 
Eichholtz and Yönder (2015) also include ln(Assets) and Leverage as control variables in their 
investment model for listed REITs. FFO and LOC used are not accounted for in Eichholtz and 
Yönder (2015) but are included here to explore whether these variables affect RE investment 
growth in unlisted REITs. Brown and Riddiough (2003) argue that listed REITs use bank credit 
lines to fund their investment and subsequently pay off the credit lines from long-term public 
debt. Similarly, Ooi, Wong, and Ong (2012) posit that listed REITs are more likely to rely on 
bank credit lines to undertake new investments. Even though listed REITs are generally noted to 
finance their investment activity using external finance (Ott, Riddiough, and Yi, 2005), FFO is 
included in the investment model for unlisted REITs. Due to the high cost of external finance for 
these firms, FFO may also useful for investment activity. 
Variables definitions are provided in Table 1. Also included are 81 calendar-quarter 
indicator variables (Q) to control fixed effects. One quarter has been suppressed. When the 
analysis covers only the equity-raising period, 72 calendar-quarter indicator variables (Q) are 
included. Five property-type indicator variables (P) are also accounted for. Industrial and self-
storage property types are categorized together and suppressed in the analysis. The subscripts i 
and t represent the firm and quarter, respectively, in order to account for the panel nature of the 
data. The last parameter in Equation (3) is the disturbance term. 
3.1.2 Comparison to Listed REITs 
The methodology discussed thus far has covered only unlisted REITs. A comparison to listed 
REITs should offer insights into the liquidity management policies relative to firms that have the 
ability to periodically access public equity markets through seasoned equity offerings. An issue 
is that any comparison between two dissimilar groups of firms could have limited meaning if 
35 
 
there are underlying characteristics which differ that would cause some firms to elect to be 
unlisted. To address issues with sample selection, the study uses a propensity score matching 
technique introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Based on the propensity score matching, 
observations of firm-quarters for listed REITs are selected for inclusion in the matched sample 
when the relevant characteristics are the most similar to those of an unlisted counterpart. A probit 
model for the full sample of firms is used to generate the propensity scores that are used in the 
matching. The identification model for unlisted firms is based on a model used by Michaely and 
Roberts (2012) with minimal modifications; they consider dividend policies for private and 
public firms. The probit estimation for the difference between listed and unlisted REIT outcomes 
includes Assets, FFO, Age and Leverage. The model also includes 85 quarter dummies (Q) and 
one quarter is omitted as the reference category. Equation (4) has more quarter fixed effects than 
the previous Equations because the data for the listed REITs starts from the fourth quarter of 
1991 to the first quarter of 2013 whereas the data for the unlisted REITs starts from the fourth 
quarter of 1992 to the first quarter of 2013. This creates an unbalanced panel of 9,422 
observations for the two groups before the matching. The probit model for matching takes the 
following form: 
(4)  Pr[Unlisted REIT = 1] = β0 + β1 Ageit + β2 ln(Assetsit) + β3 FFOit + β4 Leverageit  
+ Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
The dependent variable equals one if the firm is a unlisted REIT and zero otherwise. All 
variables are defined in the Table 1. The disturbance term is ε. The observations reduce to 2,856 
after the matching. After composing the probit results from Equation (4), Hypotheses 4 and 5 
will be tested.  
Hypothesis 4 
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Hypothesis 4 examines the differences in cash holdings between listed and unlisted REITs. The 
premise here is that unlisted REITs are expected to hold more cash reserves than their exchange-
listed counterparts. The hypothesis is tested using the model below: 
(5)  Cashit = β0 + β1 I{Unlisted REITit} + β2 ln(Assetsit) + β3 Leverageit + β4 FFOit  
+ β5 I{Internally advisedit}+ β6 LOC availableit  
+ β7 I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit) + β8 I{Unlisted REITit}*Leverageit  
+ β9 I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit  
+ β10 I{Unlisted REITit}*I{Internally advisedit} 
+ β11 I{Unlisted REITit}*LOC availableit + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
Equation (5) is similar in form to Equation (2) and has conventional controls used in the 
cash holdings literature and REIT-specific variables employed by Hardin, Highfield, Hill, and 
Kelly (2009). The dependent variable, Cash, is cash and cash equivalents scaled by book value 
of assets. A significant positive coefficient on the variable of interest, I{Unlisted REIT}, will 
support the hypothesis. I{Internally advised} is a dummy equals to one in the quarter in which 
the firm is self-advised and zero otherwise. A discussion about the possible relationship between 
the controls in the model and Cash is contained in the section under Equation (2). This is a fully-
interacted model so the variable of interest, I{Unlisted REIT}, is interacted with the other 
controls. Equation (5) also has 85 calendar-quarter indicator variables (Q) to control for fixed 
effects. One quarter is suppressed. 
Hypothesis 5 
Under Hypothesis 5, differences in bank credit lines utilization between listed and unlisted 
REITs will be tested. This hypothesis predicts that listed REITs are more likely to draw down on 
their credit lines compared to their unlisted counterparts. In other words, unlisted REITs are 
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expected to have less reliance on bank lines of credit as an alternative source of liquidity 
compared to their listed REIT counterparts. The estimating model is expressed as: 
(6)  LOC usedit = β0 + β1 I{Unlisted REITit} + β2 ln(Assetsit) + β3 FFOit + β4 RE investmentit  
+ β5 Ageit + β6 I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit)  
+ β7 I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit + β8 I{Unlisted REITit}*RE investmentit  
+ β9 I{Unlisted REITit}*Ageit + Σβj Pj + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
The dependent variable, LOC used, is bank credit lines drawn scaled by total credit lines 
available. A negative coefficient on the variable of interest, I{Unlisted REIT}, will support the 
prediction. Equation (6) accounts for ln(Assets), FFO, RE Investment and Age. Each of the 
control variables is interacted with the variable of interest, I{Unlisted REIT}, which is an 
indicator variable. Five property dummies and 85 calendar-quarter indicator variables (Q) are 
included to control for fixed effects. Industrial and self-storage property types are categorized 
together and suppressed in the analysis. 
 Some of the covariates used in Equation (6) are also employed by Hardin and Hill 
(2011), An, Hardin, and Wu (2012), and Ooi, Wong, and Ong (2012). In Hardin and Hill (2011), 
the proxy for firm size is the natural log of the market value of equity. Since market values are 
unavailable for unlisted REITs, firm size is proxied by the natural log of the book value of assets 
in this study. In their model, they hypothesized LOC used to be positively associated with Assets 
and RE investment but they argue that the direction of relation between LOC used and FFO is 
ambiguous. Ooi, Wong, and Ong (2012) document a negative coefficient for firm Age in their 
credit lines utilization model.  
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3.2 Robustness Checks 
In addition to the models discussed, several robustness checks are performed. For the unlisted 
REIT sample, the Apple series of REITs have some peculiar features. The Apple umbrella of 
unlisted REITs includes Apple REIT Six, Apple REIT Seven, Apple REIT Eight, Apple REIT 
Nine, Apple Hospitality Two, and Apple Hospitality Five. They are underwritten by one 
brokerage firm: David Lerner Associates and are noted to transaction business extensively 
among themselves (i.e., self-dealing). To ensure that the results are not impacted by the in-house 
activities of the Apple REIT firms, the analysis is also conducted excluding Apple REITs from 
the sample.  
 The probit matching model in Equation (4) assumes normality in the distribution of the 
data. The matching results will be biased if the data is not normally distributed. In order to 
ensure that the results are not biased, a logit procedure will also be applied in the matching.  
In the final series of robustness checks, a full sample analyses without the matching 
preconditioning step applied to the date is undertaken. Given that the sample is collected over a 
longer time period, changes in legislation over the period may impact on the results. In order to 
account for some of the changes in legislation, the analysis for cash holdings starts from 1993 
instead of 1991 to cater for the modern REIT era. The cash holdings model is also estimated 
from the year 2001 onwards to account for reductions in REIT dividend payments from 95% to 
90% of taxable income. Finally, property sector indicator variables are included in the cash 
holdings model as additional controls.  
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CHAPTER FOUR―ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
4.0 Descriptive Statistics 
This section discusses basic statistics such as means, standard deviations and correlation 
coefficients of the variables used in the analysis. It begins with only the unlisted REIT sample 
partitioning the means and standard deviations into equity offering and post-offering periods. 
The section also provides statistics of listed REITs before and after the propensity score 
matching. 
4.0.1 Summary Statistics: Unlisted REITs 
Table 2 presents the univariate statistics for only the unlisted REITs sample. Firms are separated 
into offering and post-equity offering periods. This allows the intra-sample comparison of 
unlisted REITs. The post-equity offering unlisted REITs are older (19.7 against 7.9) and have 
larger assets than the equity offering unlisted REITs ($908 million versus $841 million). To 
reduce issues with survivorship bias, firms which have been delisted, acquired or merged are 
allowed to stay in the sample until their change of status (following An, Cook, and Zumpano, 
2011).  
The first panel of Table 2 shows that equity-raising unlisted REITs hold substantially 
more cash than post-offering period unlisted REITs. The mean cash holdings are 13% for the 
equity-raising unlisted REITs versus 5% for non-raising sample. When unlisted REITs are 
raising equity, they stockpile more than double the quantity of cash held during the period when 
they are not equity-raising. The magnitude of unlisted REIT cash holdings overall is relatively 
high when compared to the cash ratios reported for listed REITs in the range of 2-3%, as 
reported in Hardin, Highfield, Hill, and Kelly (2009), Riddiough and Wu (2009), Ooi, Wong, 
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and Ong (2012), and Eichholtz and Yönder (2015). The equity offering period cash ratio for 
unlisted REITs is even higher than 9-11% reported for non-REIT private firms, documented in 
Brav (2009), Gao, Harford, and Li (2013), and Farre-Mensa (2014). Thus, cash is an important 
liquidity instrument for unlisted REITs.  
∆Cash is simply the difference between current quarter and previous quarter cash. 
Change in cash for unlisted REITs is positive during the offering period and negative in the post-
offering period. Unlisted REITs tend to increase their cash stock in each quarter while they are 
raising new equity; cash reserves are then depleted during quarters when there is no access to 
external equity. By comparison, Gao, Harford, and Li (2013) report average cash growth of 0.3% 
for non-REIT private firms. 
Table 2. Summary statistics for unlisted REITs 
 
  Offering Period 
Post‒Offering 
Period 
Test of 
differences 
Variable Mean Std dev Mean Std dev t-stat p-value 
Cash (%) 12.7 12.7 4.9 7.2 14.5 0.000 
∆Cash (%) 2.7 11.4 -1.6 34.3 9.1 0.000 
Proceeds (%) 13.8 15.8 0.0 0.0 
  RE investment growth (%)  78.1  129.0  7.1  49.5  14.2 0.000
RE investment (%)    67.9      24.2  73.4 26.7 -4.1 0.000 
Assets (in millions) $841.2 $1,272.6 $908.1 $1,326.8 -1.0 0.334 
Revenue (in millions) $21.0 $34.4 $29.9 $39.5 -4.5 0.000 
FFO (in millions) $6.2 $13.6 $7.7 13.8 -2.0 0.042 
LOC available (in millions)  $47.1 $90.3 $28.5 $59.5 4.7 0.000 
LOC used (%) 16.0 28.9 15.8 29.0 0.1 0.926 
Leverage (%) 43.0 21.2 41.1 24.4 1.6 0.107 
I{Internally advised}  0.5 6.8 11.1 31.5 -8.4 0.000 
       Age (quarters) 7.9 5.8 19.7 11.5 -23.7 0.000
Observations       645    783     
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for only the unlisted REITs sample including 
the sample mean (Mean) and standard deviation (Std dev). The offering period shows 
summary statistics when the firms have access to equity. The after offering period is when 
equity becomes unavailable. The last penal is the test of differences between the two 
samples and the corresponding p-values.  
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Variable definitions: Cash, ∆Cash, Proceeds, RE investment and Leverage are scaled by 
Assets and expressed in percentage terms in the table. Cash is cash and equivalents. ∆Cash 
is quarterly change in Cash. RE investment is total real estate investment net of depreciation, 
scaled by Assets. RE investment growth is percentage change in real estate investment from 
quarter to quarter. I{Internally advised} takes the value of one in the quarter in which the 
firm is advised internally and it is expressed in percentage terms in the table. LOC available 
is bank credit lines available. Age is calculated starting from the quarter data for the firm 
became available. LOC available, Assets, Revenue and funds from operations (FFO) are all 
expressed in millions in this table. LOC used is LOC drawn scaled by LOC available and it 
is expressed in percentage terms. All continuous variables are Winsorized at the 2
nd
 and 98
th 
percentiles. 
Table 2 also shows that unlisted REITs are heavily dependent on external financing for 
capital sourcing. For equity-raising unlisted REITs, long-term debt is the largest source of funds 
(43%), followed by equity proceeds (13%). Internally generated funds (FFO) only make up a 
small proportion of total funds ($6 million, or 0.4% of assets). This is consistent with the 
argument that higher dividend requirements reduce the amount of internal equity available to 
REITs (Ott, Riddiough, and Yi, 2005). Non-equity raising unlisted REITs, on average, have 
higher Revenue ($29 million versus $20 million). They also tend to have higher RE investment 
(73% versus 68%). During the equity-raising period, they tend to increase their asset base at a 
rapid pace. RE investment growth is 78% during the offering period compared to just 7% in the 
post-offering period. Eichholtz and Yönder (2015) report a mean RE investment growth of 14% 
for listed REITs. This is less than an average RE investment growth of 39% for unlisted REITs 
(combining offering and post-offering samples). The noted difference in RE investment growth 
between listed and unlisted REITs may be explained by the organizational lifecycle of a typical 
unlisted REIT which begins as a blind pool offering without assets under management and then 
experiences very rapid growth.  
 Differences in values for Assets, Revenue and RE investment between the offering period 
and post-offering samples suggest that the focus of unlisted REIT managers possibly shifts 
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toward improving operational efficiency once they are no longer preoccupied with the task of 
raising equity externally. The improvement in operational efficiency during the post-offering 
period for unlisted REITs can also be seen in increased FFO ($8 million versus $6 million). It 
can also be argued that when unlisted REITs are raising equity, their liquidity needs are higher. 
On average, they have higher LOC available ($47 million versus $28 million), higher Cash and 
∆Cash, and slightly higher Leverage (43% versus 41%). Unlisted REITs with access to equity 
have a smaller proportion of their operational period being internally-advised (0.5% versus 
11%). The majority of unlisted REITs start initially as externally-advised firms but as they 
mature, some become internally-advised.  
In order to ensure that the independent variables used in the regression analysis are not 
highly correlated, a correlation matrix is presented in Table 3. It is clear from Table 3 that 
correlations are within conventional limits and do not pose potential problems to the regression 
analysis. A few correlation coefficients stand out including: the correlation between Cash and 
I{Equity raising}: 0.36, the correlation between RE investment growth and I{Equity raising}: 
0.35, the correlation between Proceeds and I{Equity raising}: 0.54, the correlation between RE 
investment and Cash: -0.50, and the correlation between Cash and Proceeds: 0.54.  
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Table 3. Correlation matrix for sample of unlisted REITs 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 I{Equity raising} 1 
           
              2 I{Internally advised} -0.22 1 
          
  
[0.00] 
           3 Cash 0.36 -0.03 1 
         
  
[0.00] [0.27] 
          4 Age -0.53 0.06 -0.32 1 
        
  
[0.00] [0.02] [0.00] 
         5 Leverage 0.04 0.08 -0.35 0.08 1 
       
  
[0.11] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
        6 FFO -0.15 -0.10 -0.22 0.24 -0.16 1 
      
  
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
       7 ln(Assets) 0.09 -0.07 -0.18 0.16 0.14 0.10 1 
     
  
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
      8 RE investment growth 0.35 -0.02 0.16 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.02 1 
    
  
[0.00] [0.49] [0.00] [0.76] [0.76] [0.02] [0.51] 
     9 LOC used 0.00 0.02 -0.25 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.22 0.002 1 
   
  
[0.93] [0.52] [0.00] [0.00] [0.48] [0.00] [0.59] [0.94] 
    10 Proceeds 0.54 -0.12 0.54 -0.42 -0.17 -0.27 -0.08 0.32 -0.05 1 
  
  
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.07] 
   11 RE investment -0.11 0.09 -0.50 -0.05 0.29 0.15 0.11 -0.07 0.18 -0.22 1 
 
  
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.09] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] 
  12 ∆Cash 0.08 -0.01 0.05 -0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.00 -0.00 0.17 -0.00 1 
    [0.00] [0.83] [0.05] [0.01] [0.81] [0.24] [0.32] [0.88] [0.91] [0.00] [0.95]   
Note: The table presents correlation coefficients and their corresponding p-values in parentheses of the variables used in the 
regression analysis for only the unlisted sample. All variables are defined in Table 1.  
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4.0.2 Probit for matching results and summary statistics for listed REITs   
The probit results from Table 4 reveal that unlisted REITs are significantly younger, smaller, 
have lower FFO and use less Leverage. The dependent variable in the matching equals one if the 
firm is unlisted and zero otherwise. The propensity score matching is then based on a one-to-one 
nearest neighbor matching with replacement for the predicted values from the probit model. The 
observations reduce to 2,856 from 9,422 following the matching. The post-match probit results 
in Panels B of Table 4 confirm that the matching procedure is successful. Specifically, almost 
every coefficient reduces in statistical significance. Additionally, the pseudo-R squared reduces 
from 33% in the pre-matched results to 0% in the post-matched results.  
Table 4. Probit for matching  
 
Dependent variable: I{Unlisted REITit} 
Panel A Full sample     
    Variable Coefficient χ2 p-value 
Constant -1.234 0.0 0.980 
Ageit -0.030 463.9 0.000 
ln(Assetsit) -0.315 495.5 0.000 
FFOit -13.454 39.8 0.000 
Leverageit -1.931 340.4 0.000 
Quarter fixed effects                              Yes[85] 
     Pseudo R-Squared 
 
33% 
Observations  9,422 
    Panel B Matched sample 
      Variable Coefficient χ2  p-value 
Constant 1.809 42.6 0.000 
Ageit -0.006 8.1 0.004 
ln(Assetsit) -0.082 21.0 0.000 
FFOit  -5.531 4.7 0.030 
Leverageit -0.777 42.2 0.000 
Quarter fixed effects                      Yes[85] 
    Pseudo R-Squared 
 
0% 
Observations  2,856 
Notes: This table presents results from the probit model which is used to 
generate the propensity scores for matching. The dependent variable equals 
one if the firm is unlisted and zero otherwise. All variables are defined in 
Table 1. The estimation includes the full sample consisting of all publicly 
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listed and unlisted REITs. The table presents the parameter estimate for 
each variable, the Wald-χ2 statistic and the corresponding p-value. The 
regression model for the matching takes the form: 
(4)  Pr[Unlisted REIT = 1] = β0 + β1 Ageit + β2 ln(Assetsit) + β3 FFOit  
+ β4 Leverageit + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
  
 Summary statistics for the matched sample are also presented in Table 5. The matched 
sample includes 1,428 firm-quarter observations for unlisted REITs matched with 1,428 firm-
quarter observations for exchange-listed REITs. The matched sample includes observations for 
listed REITs which have similar characteristics to those influencing the unlisted REITs. The 
listed REITs selected for inclusion in the matched sample are similar to those of the unlisted 
REITs in Age (14.1 to 15.1) and Leverage (42% to 45%).  
Statistics reported in Table 5 also show that unlisted REITs accumulate more cash than 
listed REITs (8% to 3%). This difference persists even after conducting the matching process 
(8% to 5%). The LOC available amount for listed REITs is greater than that of unlisted REITs 
($254 million before matching and $148 million after matching to $39 million). For listed 
REITs, about 32% of the credit available is actually used (or 26% in the matched sample). This 
corresponds with the 36% credit utilization reported by Hardin and Hill (2011) during 1999 to 
2009. Considering the matched samples, 26% credit utilization by listed REITs is considerably 
larger than 16% of available bank credit lines used by unlisted REITs. The matched sample of 
listed REITs has higher Revenue than unlisted REITs ($33 million versus $28 million). Listed 
REITs are significantly more likely to be internally-advised compared to unlisted REITs (49% 
versus 6%). The unlisted REIT sample includes firms that are rather young and smaller, which 
may be more efficient to operate using external advisors initially. RE investment is higher for 
listed REITs prior to matching (79% to 71%) but similar after the matching (70% for listed 
versus 71% for unlisted). 
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Table 5. Summary statistics for samples of listed and unlisted REITs 
  
Unlisted 
 
Listed: 
Full Sample 
Listed: 
Matched Sample 
Variable Mean Std dev Mean Std dev Mean Std dev 
Cash (%) 8.0 7.9 2.6 4.3 5.0 6.7 
LOC available (millions) $38.7 $84.2 $254.5 $321.7 $148.5 $206.6 
LOC used (%) 15.7 28.5 32.1 30.1 26.42 30.2 
Assets (millions) $962.0 $1,714.3 $2,148.3 $2,994.9 $811.6 $1,407.2 
Revenue (millions) $28.2 $49.6 $88.0 $134.8 $33.0 $63.6 
FFO (millions) $7.6 $14.9 $28.8 $43.3 $8.3 $18.9 
Leverage (%) 42.2 23.0 54.1 18.1 45.3 23.4 
I{Internally advised}  6.3 24.3 62.1 48.5 49.2 50.0 
RE investment (%) 70.9 25.7 78.8 21.2 70.5 30.2 
Age (quarters) 14.1 10.9 27.8 20.4 15.1 13.7 
Observations 1428 7994 1428 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the publicly listed and unlisted REITs samples 
including the sample means (Mean), standard deviations (Std dev). The last panel shows 
summary statistics for the listed firms after the matching.  
Variable definitions: Cash is cash and cash equivalents Assets. RE investment is total real estate 
investment net of depreciation and the variable is scaled by Assets. Leverage is total liabilities 
divided by Assets. Cash, RE investment and Leverage are all expressed in percentage terms in the 
table. I{Internally advised} takes the value of one in the quarter in which the firm is advised 
internally and it is written in percentage terms. LOC available is bank credit lines available, in 
millions. Age is calculated starting from the quarter data for the firm became available. Assets, 
Revenue and FFO are all expressed in millions. LOC used is LOC drawn scaled by LOC 
available and it is expressed in percentage terms. All continuous variables are Winsorized at the 
2
nd
 and 98
th
 percentiles. 
To ensure that the regression results are not influenced by highly correlated independent 
variables, a correlation matrix of the variables is presented in Table 6. A cursory observation 
indicates that there are few potential multicollinearity problems. All the coefficients are within 
conventional limits. The highest correlation coefficient in the table is -0.40, which is the 
correlation between I{Unlisted REIT} and I{Internally advised}. Unlisted REITs are less likely 
to have internal advisors when compared to their listed counterparts. This is consistent with 
summary statistics reported in Table 5.  
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Table 6. Correlation matrix for samples of listed and unlisted REITs 
 
Notes: The table presents correlation coefficients and their corresponding p-values in parentheses 
of the variables used in the regression analysis for both the listed and unlisted REITs sample. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
4.1 Main Empirical Results 
4.1.1 Unlisted REITs: Cash savings from equity proceeds 
In Farre-Mensa (2014), Kim and Weisbach (2008) and MacLean (2011), firms are noted to raise 
external equity during times when issuance costs are low and save most of the proceeds as cash 
to avoid issuing new equity during higher issuance costs periods. MacLean (2011) argues that in 
the 1970s, for each additional dollar of equity issued by a non-REIT firm, 23 cents was saved as 
cash but this number increased to about 60 cents per each dollar issued more recently. Kim and 
Weisbach (2008) estimate in their sample of non-REIT firms that for each additional dollar 
raised in an IPO, approximately 49 cents is withheld as cash in the subsequent year. 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 I{Unlisted REIT} 1 
        
           2 I{Internally advised} -0.40 1 
       
  
[0.00] 
        3 Cash 0.33 -0.19 1 
      
  
[0.00] [0.27] 
       4 Age -0.25 0.24 -0.22 1 
     
  
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
      5 Leverage -0.22 0.17 -0.29 0.26 1 
    
  
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
    6 FFO -0.14 0.08 -0.17 0.12 -0.26 1 
   
  
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
    7 ln(Assets) -0.25 0.32 -0.25 0.40 0.33 0.08 1 
  
  
[0.00] [0.01] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
   8 LOC used -0.19 0.19 -0.26 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.15 1 
 
  
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
 9 RE investment -0.13 0.10 -0.37 0.01 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.12 1 
  
 
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.35] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]   
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Table 7 presents the estimation results for the equity issuance–cash savings model of 
Equation (1). In Table 7, ∆Cash is the dependent variable. New equity proceeds are unobtainable 
in SNL Financial and were therefore manually collected from individual 10-K and 10-Q filings 
in the SEC Edgar database for each firm. New equity proceeds are calculated after netting out 
issuance costs and dividend re-investment proceeds. Leverage is total liabilities, scaled by 
Assets. LOC available is bank credit lines available scaled by Assets. FFO is funds from 
operations scaled by Revenue. ln(Assets) is included to account for firm size. The variables 
Proceeds, Leverage, LOC available, FFO and ln(Assets) are all lagged one period. The Age of 
the firm is also included which is calculated from the quarter data became available. Five 
property dummies (P) and 72 quarter dummies (Q) are accounted for in the results but are not 
reported for the sake of brevity. Industrial and self-storage property types are categorized 
together and suppressed in the analysis. The regression only covers the period in which unlisted 
REITs have access to equity. 
Table 7. Cash savings from equity proceeds model for equity-raising unlisted REITs 
 
Dependent variable: ∆Cashit  (1)             ( 2) 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Constant             -0.032 -1.1     0.101 1.2 
Proceedsit-1                  0.249
***
 3.4         0.223
***
 2.6 
Leverageit-1 
  
        -0.038 -0.9 
LOC availableit-1 
  
        -0.119
***
 -3.7 
FFOit-1 
  
   -0.019 -1.4 
ln(Assets)it-1 
  
   -0.008 -1.6 
Ageit            -0.001 -1.4    -0.000 -0.3 
Property fixed effects                                Yes                                  Yes 
Quarter fixed effects                        Yes[72]                 Yes[72] 
R-Squared 27% 30% 
Observations 580 580 
Notes: The dependent variable is ∆Cash scaled by Assets. *** indicates significance 
at the 1% level. In column (1), other sources of funds are excluded. Column (2) 
accounts for other sources of funds and firm size. The full regression model is 
expressed as: 
(1)  ΔCashit = β0 + β1 Proceedsit-1 + β2 Leverageit-1 + β3 LOC availableit-1+ β4 FFOit-1 
49 
 
+ β5 ln(Assetsit-1) + β6 Ageit + Σβj Pj + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
Equation (1) includes a term for new equity proceeds, Proceeds. New equity 
proceeds are unobtainable in SNL Financial and were therefore manually collected 
from individual 10-K and 10-Q filings in the SEC Edgar database for each firm. 
New equity proceeds are calculated after netting out issuance costs and dividend re-
investment proceeds. The variable is scaled by Assets. Leverage is total liabilities 
scaled by Assets. LOC available is bank credit lines available scaled by Assets. 
FFO is funds from operations scaled by Revenue. ln(Assets) is included to account 
for size. The variables Proceeds, Leverage, LOC available, FFO and ln(Assets) are 
all lagged on quarter. The Age of the firm is also included which is calculated from 
the quarter data became available. Five property dummies (P) and 72 dummies (Q) 
are accounted for in the model to control for fixed effects. Industrial and self-
storage property types are categorized together and suppressed in the analysis. 
Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and quarter levels. 
Column (1) of Table 7 reveals that during the offering period, 25 cents of each additional 
dollar of equity raised in the previous period is accumulated as cash in the current period by 
unlisted firms. This result is consistent with the expectation that some portion of equity proceeds 
of unlisted REITs would be allocated to cash reserves. The estimated amount reduces by only 3 
cents when other sources of capital such as Leverage, LOC available, FFO and Assets are 
accounted for in the second panel. The 3 cents reduction occurs as the coefficient for bank line of 
credit availability becomes significant. This implies that the availability of bank lines of credit 
slightly reduces the need to stockpile precautionary cash from equity proceeds.  
The 25 cents is lower than the 49 and 60 cents documented for non-REIT firms in Kim 
and Weisbach (2008) and MacLean (2011), respectively; nonetheless it is a high proportion to 
hold as cash given that all REITs must distribute 90% of their taxable income as dividends. 
Under these constraints, a much higher percentage of equity proceeds would be expected to 
finance new investment rather than remain as accumulated cash. Non-REIT firms have the 
ability to use SEOs to raise money solely for cash savings. Unlisted REITs have a continuous 
window within which to raise equity and need to invest concurrently. The results also show that 
Leverage, FFO, ln(Assets) and Age have no impact on the cash savings of unlisted REITs. 
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4.1.2 Differences in cash holdings between equity-raising and non-raising unlisted REITs 
The results in Table 7 show that when unlisted REITs have access to equity, they accumulate 
some of the proceeds as cash. It is then relevant to consider whether such cash levels are reduced 
in the post-offering period. Table 8 presents the results estimated from Equation (2). Similar 
independent variables have been employed by Hardin, Highfield, Hill, and Kelly (2009) to 
investigate the determinants of listed REITs cash holdings.  
Table 8. Cash holdings results for equity-raising and non-raising unlisted REITs 
 
Dependent variable: Cashit 
  Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Constant              0.219
***
 8.5 
I{Equity raisingit}              0.427
***
 9.0 
ln(Assetsit)             -0.009
***
 -5.6 
Leverageit             -0.073
***
 -6.6 
FFOit             -0.034
***
 -5.6 
I{Internally advisedit}                 0.018
**
 2.0 
LOC availableit             -0.147
***
 -8.2 
I{Equity raisingit}*ln(Assetsit)             -0.018
***
 -5.4 
I{Equity raisingit}*Leverageit             -0.276
***
 -11.9 
I{Equity raisingit}*FFOit              0.001
***
 2.5 
I{Equity raisingit}*I{Internally advisedit}         -0.044 -0.7 
I{Equity raisingit}*LOC availableit          -0.026
*
 1.8 
Quarter fixed effects                        Yes[81] 
R-Squared 51% 
Observations 1,428 
Notes: The dependent variable is Cash scaled by Assets. The table 
compares the cash holdings of only unlisted REITs when they have access 
to equity and when equity becomes unavailable. 
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The results are 
estimated from the following baseline model: 
(2)  Cashit = β0 + β1 I{Equity raisingit} + β2 ln(Assetsit) + β3 Leverageit + β4 FFOit 
+ β5 I{Internally advisedit} + β6 LOC availableit  
+ β7 I{Equity raisingit}*ln(Assetsit) + β8 I{Equity raisingit}*Leverageit  
+ β9 I{Equity raisingit}*FFOit 
+ β10 I{Equity raisingit}*I{Internally advisedit}  
+ β11 I{Equity raisingit}*LOC availableit + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
I{Internally advised} is a dummy equals to one in the quarter in which the 
firm is self-advised and zero otherwise. LOC available is bank credit lines 
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available scaled by Assets. The variable of interest, I{Equity raising}, takes 
the value of one if the unlisted REIT firm has access to equity and zero 
otherwise. I{Equity raising} is also interacted with the cash holdings 
controls. Table 8 also has 81 quarter fixed effects. One quarter has been 
suppressed. Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and quarter levels. 
All other variables are defined in Table 1.  
The dependent variable in Table 8 is Cash scaled by Assets. I{Internally advised} is a 
dummy equals to one in the quarter in which the firm is self-advised and zero otherwise. LOC 
available is bank lines of credit available scaled by Assets. The variable of interest, I{Equity 
raising}, takes the value of one if the unlisted REIT firm has access to equity and zero otherwise. 
Since this is a fully interacted model, I{Equity raising} is also interacted with the cash holdings 
controls in the analysis. The 81 quarter dummies included in the analysis are not reported in 
Table 8.  
When unlisted REITs have access to equity; they tend to hold more cash (43% more cash 
relative to assets). This result supports the hypothesized relationship that unlisted REITs are 
expected to hold more cash during the equity-raising period than during the post-offering period. 
Table 8 also shows that larger firms, measured by ln(Assets), hold less cash suggesting that with 
size comes visibility and enhanced access external capital sources. Higher Leverage reduces the 
need to stockpile cash. Firms with greater FFO and bank credit lines available (LOC available) 
have diminished need to stockpile cash. The estimated coefficients are consistent with findings in 
the cash holdings literature (e.g., Kim, Mauer, and Sherman, 1998; Hardin, Highfield, Hill, and 
Kelly, 2009; Gao, Harford, and Li, 2013). Higher cash holdings for equity-raising unlisted REITs 
(i.e., the coefficient on the variable, I{Equity raising}) are in line with the summary statistics in 
Table 2 where the mean cash holdings in the equity offering period is 13% compared to 5% in 
the post-offering period. Evidence for higher cash holding when firms have access to equity is at 
odds with conventional wisdom and much of the finance literature on cash holdings. It is well-
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documented that firms with better access to capital markets tend to hold less cash (Keynes, 1936; 
Kim, Mauer, and Sherman, 1998; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 1999; Almeida, 
Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Brav, 2009; Saunders and Steffen, 2011). There are some 
reasons as to why this is different for equity-offering unlisted REITs:  
First, when unlisted REITs are raising equity, they are experiencing rapid investment 
growth and internally-generated cash flow may be unpredictable which increases the 
precautionary need for additional cash reserves. As the unlisted REIT matures beyond the equity 
offering period, it becomes more efficient and the need for precautionary cash decreases. In 
Figure 2 below, the relationship between cash holdings and FFO is presented.  
Figure 2. Cash holdings and FFO for unlisted REITs 
 
 
Notes: The figure comes from the author’s calculations using the unlisted 
REITs data and plots mean values for Cash (dark grey) and FFO (light grey). 
The horizontal axis shows quarters for unlisted REITs starting four (-4) 
quarters to the last quarter of the equity offering (0) and eight (8) quarters after 
the equity offering ends. 
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The figure shows average cash holdings and FFO of unlisted REITS from four quarters 
prior (-4) to the last quarter of the equity offering period (0) and eight (8) quarters after the 
equity offering period. FFO is a good proxy for performance in the REIT industry compared to 
net income. It is apparent from Figure 2 that FFO is more stable in the post equity offering 
period. Thus, during periods when FFO is highly volatile, as occurs during the period of equity 
access, cash holdings for unlisted REITs are at elevated levels.  
Second, the results from equity issuance–cash savings (Table 7) show that equity-raising 
unlisted REITs can increase their level of cash holdings from equity proceeds. This channel is 
unavailable to non-raising unlisted REITs. In addition, since the equity-raising period is known 
to close at some point in time, the precautionary need to stockpile cash for future needs is greater 
during the offering period.  
Finally, the real estate investment growth (RE investment growth) of unlisted REITs is 
substantially greater during the equity-raising period (78% versus 7%), and short-term liquidity 
may be needed in order to support this early investment growth. Cash may be one of the most 
attractive forms of short-term liquidity. This last point leads us to the next section – examining 
the impact of cash on unlisted REITs real estate investment growth.  
4.1.3 Impact of cash on unlisted REITs real estate investment growth 
Given that access to capital has an impact on the investment ability of a firm, this section 
investigates the impact of cash on real estate investment growth of unlisted REITs. The results 
are presented in Table 9. The dependent variable in the Table 9 is real estate investment growth 
from quarter to quarter (RE investment growth). The same dependent variable is employed by 
Eichholtz and Yönder (2015) to proxy for real estate investment activity of listed REITs. It is 
scaled by 100 in this analysis in order to reduce the magnitude of the coefficients of the 
54 
 
independent variables in the regression and to provide ease of interpretation. The Cash and 
Proceeds variables have been logged for the same reason.  
 The regression includes ln(Assets), Leverage, LOC used and FFO. Included, but not 
reported, are five property-type indicator variables (P) and 72 calendar-quarter indicator 
variables (Q) to control fixed-effects. Eighty-one calendar-quarter indicator variables (Q) are 
included when the analysis extends to the post-offering period. Industrial and self-storage 
property types are categorized together and suppressed in the analysis. 
Table 9. Real estate investment activity results for unlisted REITs 
 
Dependent variable: RE investment growthit                                                                            
           (1)        (2)        (3) 
[post-offering] 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Constant        1.396
**
 2.1   1.467
**
 2.2      0.126 0.6 
ln(Cash)it-1        0.108
*
 1.9   0.134
**
 2.4     -0.005 -0.4 
ln(Proceeds)it-1        0.105
***
 2.5     
ln(Assets)it-1       -0.005 -0.1     -0.017 -0.4     -0.009 -0.5 
Leverageit-1        0.143 0.4     -0.072 -0.2    0.335
***
 3.0 
FFOit-1        0.014 0.1     -0.030 -0.2      0.010 0.4 
LOC usedit-1        0.235 1.2      0.251 1.3      0.056 0.8 
Property fixed effects                     Yes          Yes          Yes 
Quarter fixed effects                 Yes[72]       Yes[72]        Yes[81] 
R-Squared  22%  22%     14% 
Observations 580 580   732 
Notes: The dependent variable is percentage real estate investment growth from quarter to 
quarter. The variable is scaled by 100 in order to reduce the magnitude of the coefficients of the 
independent variables and make them easier to interpret. Cash and Proceeds are also logged for 
the same reason. The table examines the impact of cash holdings on real estate investment 
activity. Columns (1) and (2) only consider unlisted REITs with access to equity. In column (1), 
ln(Cash) and ln(Proceeds) are accounted for in the regression. Column (2) excludes equity 
proceeds. In column (3), the sample covers unlisted REITs when equity becomes unavailable. 
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The results are 
estimated from the following baseline model: 
(3)  RE investment growthit = β0 + β1 ln(Cashit-1) + β2 ln(Assetsit-1) + β3 Leverageit-1   
+ β4 FFOit-1 + β5 LOC usedit-1 + Σβj Pj + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
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ln(Cash), ln(Proceeds), ln(Assets), Leverage, FFO and LOC used are lagged one quarter. 
Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and quarter levels. All variables are defined in 
Table 1. 
 Table 9 indicates that Cash is positively associated with investment growth at unlisted 
REITs who have access to equity, even after controlling for other variables such as Proceeds in 
column (1). Taking the coefficient for Cash, a 1% increase in cash in the prior quarter leads to 
increased real estate investment by 0.1% in the current quarter. The size and significance of the 
Cash coefficient increase slightly when Proceeds is excluded in column (2); this emphasizes the 
importance of common equity issuance to the investment growth of unlisted REITs. The positive 
coefficient on Proceeds in column (1) is in line with the argument in Brown and Riddiough 
(2003) that financing investment is the predominant use of new equity proceeds by REITs.  
 Evidence provided in columns (1) and (2) supports the hypothesis that unlisted REIT 
cash holdings are positively related to future real estate investment growth. The positive 
coefficient on Cash is consistent with Eichholtz and Yönder (2015) who also find a positive 
relation between RE investment growth and Cash in listed REITs. In column (3), however, the 
prediction is rejected as unlisted REITs are rather found to rely on Leverage to support their 
investment growth after the period of equity access has closed. Cash appears more valuable to 
unlisted REITs during the equity offering period. This finding is consistent with very rapid 
growth during the period of equity access; unlisted REITs tend to rely on short term capital 
including cash to support that growth. FFO is insignificant as REITs in general do not typically 
rely heavily on internal cash flow to fund investment. Interestingly, LOC used is insignificant, 
unlike what is noted in Brown and Riddiough (2003) that listed REITs use bank credit lines to 
fund their investment and subsequently pay off the credit lines from long term public debt. Ooi, 
Wong, and Ong (2012) also posit that listed REITs are more likely to rely on bank credit lines to 
undertake new investments. The weaker corporate governance mechanisms and the lack of 
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operational transparency at unlisted REITs may affect the attractiveness of using bank credit 
lines to fund new investments. 
4.1.4 Listed and unlisted REITs: Comparing cash holdings 
After composing the propensity-score matched sample using the probit results in Table 4, the 
results presented in Table 10 examine the differences in cash holdings between listed and 
unlisted REITs. The model is similar to the analysis comparing the cash holdings of equity-
raising and non-raising unlisted REITs. The analysis has conventional controls used in the cash 
holdings literature and REIT specific variables employed by Hardin, Highfield, Hill, and Kelly 
(2009).  
 The dependent variable is Cash scaled by Assets. I{Internally advised} is an indicator 
variable equal to one for the quarter in which the firm is self-advised and zero otherwise. The 
variable of interest, I{Unlisted REIT}, is an indicator variable for unlisted REITs. This a fully-
interacted model so I{Unlisted REIT} is interacted with each of the cash holdings controls. Table 
10 also has 85 calendar-quarter indicator variables (Q) to account for fixed-effects but 
unreported in the interest of space. The results are categorized under three columns. In column 
(1), the analysis covers the entire sample. Column (2) compares the cash holdings of listed 
REITs to only unlisted REITs that have access to equity, reducing the sample size to 1,290. The 
comparison is based on one-to-one matching. In column (3), a comparison is made of the cash 
holdings of listed REITs to only unlisted REITs that do not have access to equity.  
 It is apparent from Table 10 that the variable of interest, I{Unlisted REIT}, is positive and 
significant, regardless of the specification. The coefficient suggests that unlisted REITs stockpile 
more cash than their listed counterparts (between 9-22% more cash). During periods when 
unlisted REITs have access to equity, their ability to hoard more cash is greater (column 2). The 
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size of the coefficient more than doubles while they are raising equity, from 9.1% to 22.3%. The 
explanations of cash savings from equity subscriptions, the need to accumulate cash to sustain 
growth and the unpredictability of FFO during equity offering period as elaborated under the 
previous two sections remain relevant here. Unlisted REITs continue to have higher cash 
holdings than listed REITs, even in the post-offering period (column 3). Overall, the results 
support the hypothesis that unlisted REITs are expected to carry more cash than their exchange-
listed REIT counterparts. Findings for control variables in Table 10 are largely consistent with 
the prior literature. Column (1) shows that larger unlisted REITs have proportionately lower 
amounts of cash held. The availability of bank lines of credit also reduces the amount of cash 
accumulated by unlisted REITs. Higher FFO reduces the need to stockpile cash for REITs in 
general. In column (2), larger REITs have reduced cash holdings. Increased leverage reduces the 
cash holdings of REITs in general. In column (3), higher FFO reduces the cash holdings of all 
REITs. 
In Figure 3, a graphical representation is shown for the average quarterly cash holdings of 
both listed and unlisted REITs from 1995 to 2012. The quarterly average of cash in a given year 
is scaled by average quarterly assets for the same year. 
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Table 10. Cash holdings results for listed and unlisted REITs 
 
Dependent variable: Cashit 
 
      (1)       (2)        (3) 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Constant  0.126
***
 6.5      0.241
***
 6.9       0.084
***
 3.5 
I{Unlisted REITit}  0.120
***
 6.6      0.223
***
 5.6       0.091
***
 4.2 
ln(Assetsit)  0.001 0.7  -0.004
*
 -1.7      0.003
**
 2.0 
Leverageit -0.156
***
 -16.2     -0.213
***
 -13.9      -0.146
***
 -12.4 
FFOit -0.045
***
 -9.8     -0.021
***
 -3.4      -0.038
***
 -6.7 
I{Internally advisedit} -0.004 -1.1     -0.018
***
 -3.3      -0.006 -1.3 
LOC availableit  0.013
***
 3.7  0.006 1.0      0.008
**
 2.0 
I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit) -0.008
***
 -5.5     -0.014
***
 -4.5      -0.011
***
 -5.7 
I{Unlisted REITit}*Leverageit  0.021
*
 1.7     -0.032
*
 -1.7       0.084
***
 6.5 
I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit -0.000 -0.8      0.000 0.8      -0.002
***
 -3.1 
I{Unlisted REITit}*I{Internally advisedit} -0.016
**
 -2.4  0.024 0.4   0.004 0.4 
I{Unlisted REITit}*LOC availableit -0.064
***
 -6.6     -0.082
***
 -6.8      -0.090
***
 -5.7 
Quarter fixed effects          Yes[85]      Yes[85]        Yes[85] 
R-Squared 26% 46% 29% 
Observations 2,856 1,290 1,566 
Notes: The dependent variable in Table 10 is Cash scaled by Assets. The table examines differences in cash 
holdings between listed and unlisted REITs. The variable of interest is I{Unlisted REIT}, which takes the 
value of one if the firm is a unlisted REIT and zero otherwise. In column (1), the analysis covers the entire 
matched sample. Column (2) compares the cash holdings of listed REITs to only unlisted REITs that have 
access to equity. Column (3) compares the cash holdings of listed REITs to only unlisted REITs that do not 
have access to equity. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels respectively. The baseline regression model for Table 10 is: 
(5)  Cashit = β0 + β1 I{Unlisted REITit} + β2 ln(Assetsit) + β3 Leverageit + β4 FFOit  
+ β5 I{Internally advisedit}+ β6 LOC availableit  
+ β7 I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit) + β8 I{Unlisted REITit}*Leverageit  
+ β9 I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit  
+ β10 I{Unlisted REITit}*I{Internally advisedit} 
+ β11 I{Unlisted REITit}*LOC availableit + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
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Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and quarter levels. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
Figure 3. Cash holdings of listed and unlisted REITs compared 
 
Notes: Figure 3 is based on the author’s calculations using the listed and 
unlisted REIT samples. It shows average cash holdings for unlisted (dark grey 
line) and listed REITs (light grey line) from the first quarter of 1995 to the 
fourth quarter of 2011
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The graph above is consistent with the empirical results in Table 10. For the full horizon, average 
cash holdings for unlisted REITs are consistently higher than listed REITs. During the period of 
the financial crisis (2008 to 2011), the average cash holdings of unlisted REITs were very high, 
and the average cash holdings for listed REITs went up as well. This period coincides with the 
2008 IRS Revenue Procedure 2008-68 that allowed listed REITs to use elective stock dividends 
in lieu of cash dividends in meeting distribution requirements in order to preserve cash.  
4.1.5 Listed and unlisted REITs: Comparing bank credit lines utilization 
The previous section shows that unlisted REITs hoard more cash than listed REITs. This is 
exacerbated during periods when unlisted REITs have access to equity. In this section, an 
examination is made as to whether unlisted REITs also tend to increase their drawdowns of 
available credit lines to satisfy liquidity needs. Perhaps the lower cash holdings by listed REITs 
can be explained in part by their heightened utilization of bank credit lines. Hardin and Hill 
(2011) posit that since listed REITs have lower cash holdings, bank credit lines may serve as an 
alternative to precautionary liquidity. Ooi, Wong, and Ong (2012) also note that listed REITs 
which have higher cash holdings are less likely to use their credit lines. 
 The estimated results for the differences in bank credit lines utilization are shown in 
Table 11. The analysis accounts for firm size, FFO, RE investment and firm Age. Each of the 
control variables is interacted with the variable of interest, I{Unlisted REIT}, which is an 
indicator variable. Five property dummies and 85 quarter fixed effects (Q) are also included in 
the analysis but not reported. Industrial and self-storage property types are categorized together 
and suppressed in the analysis. Some of the covariates used in the model are also employed by 
Hardin and Hill (2011), An, Hardin, and Wu (2012) and Ooi, Wong, and Ong (2012). In Hardin 
and Hill (2011), the proxy for firm size is the natural log of the market value of equity. Since 
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market values are unavailable for unlisted REITs, firm size is proxied by the natural log of the 
book value of assets in this study, similar to Ooi, Wong, and Ong (2012). 
Table 11. LOC used results for listed and unlisted REITs 
 
Dependent variable: LOC usedit 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Constant      0.147
*
 1.9 
I{Unlisted REITit}     -0.281
***
 -4.1 
ln(Assetsit)      0.011
**
 2.0 
FFOit     -0.021 -1.2 
RE investmentit      0.033 1.3 
Ageit      0.001 1.3 
I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit)      0.012
**
 2.1 
I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit      0.000 0.1 
I{Unlisted REITit}*RE investmentit      0.082
**
 2.3 
I{Unlisted REITit}*Ageit     -0.001 -1.5 
Property fixed effects               Yes 
Quarter fixed effects           Yes[85] 
 R-Squared 13% 
Observations 2,856 
Notes: The dependent variable, LOC used, is LOC drawn scaled by LOC 
available. 
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. The analysis compares differences in the utilization of bank 
credit lines between listed and unlisted REITs. The variable of interest is 
I{Unlisted REIT}. The results are estimated from: 
(6)  LOC usedit = β0 + β1 I{Unlisted REITit} + β2 ln(Assetsit) + β3 FFOit + β4 RE investmentit  
+ β5 Ageit + β6 I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit)  
+ β7 I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit + β8 I{Unlisted REITit}*RE investmentit  
+ β9 I{Unlisted REITit}*Ageit + Σβj Pj + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
Equation (6) accounts for Assets, FFO (scaled by revenue), RE investment 
(scaled by book value of assets) and firm Age. All the controls are 
interacted with the variable of interest, I{unlisted REITs}, which is an 
indicator variable. Five property dummies and 85 quarter fixed effects (Q) 
are also included in the analysis and one quarter suppressed. Industrial and 
self-storage property types are categorized together and suppressed in the 
analysis. Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and quarter levels. 
The variables in the model are defined in Table 1.  
 Table 11 supports the expectation that unlisted REITs would be less dependent on bank 
lines of credit as an alternative source of liquidity compared to their listed REIT counterparts. As 
stated earlier, the use of bank credit lines comes with increased monitoring and requires greater 
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transparency (Yun, 2009; Archarya, Almeida, Ippolito, and Perez, 2014). An, Hardin, and Wu 
(2012) find that listed REIT firms with information asymmetry problems and less transparent 
firms use lower bank lines of credit in liquidity management. In Table 11, the more transparent 
listed REITs have higher utilization of bank lines of credit as expected. Ghosh, Petrova, and Xiao 
(2012) note that listed REITs have significantly reduced agency problems when compared to 
other firms. In Hardin, Highfield, Hill, and Kelly (2009), the desire to increase transparency is a 
possible explanation for why listed REITs may elect not to accumulate excess cash – so that they 
can take advantage of reduced costs of external financing. In terms of the control variables, firm 
size, ln(Assets), is significantly positive for REITs in general, consistent with the findings of 
Hardin and Hill (2011) and Ooi, Wong, and Ong (2012). RE investment interaction term for 
unlisted REITs is positive and significant. 
In the graph below, average bank credit lines utilization is plotted for listed and unlisted 
REITs covering the period 1995 to 2012. Figure 4 shows average bank credit lines utilization for 
listed and unlisted REITs. On the vertical axis, average quarterly observations of bank credit 
lines drawn in a particular year are divided by average quarterly bank credit lines available for 
the same year. The diagram indicates that apart from six out of the 18 years graphed, the average 
bank credit lines utilization for listed REITs is higher. This is in line with the results in Table 11. 
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Figure 4. Bank credit lines utilization of listed and unlisted REITs compared 
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Notes: Figure 4 comes from the author’s calculations using the listed and 
unlisted REIT samples. It shows average bank credit lines utilization for unlisted 
(dark grey line) and listed REITs (light grey bars) from the first quarter of 1995 
to the fourth quarter of 2012. The vertical axis is bank credit lines drawn scaled 
by bank credit lines available. 
 
4.2 Robustness Checks 
In addition to the above results presented, the following robustness checks are undertaken:  
4.2.1 Excluding Apple REITs from unlisted REITs 
For the unlisted REIT sample, due to the uniqueness of the Apple series of REITs, the analysis 
for cash savings from equity proceeds, differences in cash holdings between equity-raising and 
non-equity raising unlisted and the impact of cash on real estate investment growth are repeated 
excluding Apple REITs. Cash holdings of listed and unlisted REITs are also compared after 
excluding the Apple REITs from the unlisted sample. The results are shown in the tables below:  
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Table 12. Cash savings from equity proceeds model for equity-raising unlisted REITs 
(excluding Apple REITs) 
 
Dependent variable: ∆Cashit 
 
    (1)                   (2) 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Constant                -0.028 -1.0          0.071 0.9 
Proceedsit-1                     0.220
***
 2.9             0.191
**
 2.1 
Leverageit-1 
  
        -0.024 -0.6 
LOC availableit-1 
  
        -0.105 -3.3 
FFOit-1 
  
         -0.022
*
 -1.7 
ln(Assets)it-1 
  
        -0.006 -1.2 
Ageit                -0.002
*
 -1.8         -0.001 -0.8 
Property fixed effects                                  Yes                                              Yes 
Quarter fixed effects                        Yes[72]                Yes[72] 
R-Squared 35% 38% 
Observations 527 527 
Notes: The dependent variable is ∆Cash scaled by Assets. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. In column (1), other sources of funds are excluded. 
Column (2) accounts for other sources of funds as well as Size. The full regression model is 
expressed as: 
(1)  ΔCashit = β0 + β1 Proceedsit-1 + β2 Leverageit-1 + β3 LOC availableit-1+ β4 FFOit-1 
+ β5 ln(Assetsit-1) + β6 Ageit-1 + Σβj Pj + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
Equation (1) includes a term for new equity proceeds (Proceeds). New equity proceeds are 
unobtainable in SNL Financial and were therefore manually collected from individual 10-K 
and 10-Q filings in the SEC Edgar database for each firm. New equity proceeds are 
calculated after netting out issuance costs and dividend re-investment proceeds. The variable 
is scaled by book value of assets. Leverage is total liabilities scaled by book value of assets. 
LOC available is the amount of bank credit lines available divided by book value of assets. 
FFO is funds from operations scaled by revenue. ln(Assets) is included to account for Size. 
The variables Proceeds, Leverage, LOC available, FFO and ln(Assets) are all lagged. The 
Age of the firm is also included which is calculated from the quarter data became available. 
Five property dummies (P) and 72 quarter dummies (Q) are accounted for in the model to 
control fixed effects. Industrial and self-storage property types are categorized together and 
suppressed in the analysis. Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and quarter levels. 
The variables in the model are defined in Table 1.  
In Table 12 above, the observations for Apple series of REITs are removed from the analysis, it 
can be seen that the variable Proceeds remains significant. The magnitude of the coefficient only 
reduces slightly from the original results.  
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Table 13 below presents the results comparing equity-raising and non-raising unlisted 
REITs after eliminating the Apple REIT observations. The coefficient of interest, I{Equity 
raising} remains positive and highly significant.  
Table 13. Cash holdings results for equity-raising and non-raising unlisted REITs  
                 (excluding Apple REITs) 
 
Dependent variable: Cashit 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Constant 0.206
***
 7.9 
I{Equity raisingit} 0.460
***
 9.2 
ln(Assetsit) -0.005
***
 -3.3 
Leverageit -0.129
***
 -9.7 
FFOit -0.032
***
 -5.3 
I{Internally advisedit} 0.028
***
 2.8 
LOC availableit -0.155
***
 -8.9 
I{Equity raisingit}*ln(Assetsit) -0.023
***
 -6.9 
I{Equity raisingit}*Leverageit -0.225
***
 -8.6 
I{Equity raisingit}*FFOit        0.001
***
 2.5 
I{Equity raisingit}*I{Internally advisedit} -0.153
***
 -8.5 
I{Equity raisingit}*LOC availableit   -0.021 -1.5 
Quarter fixed effects            Yes[81] 
R-Squared 50% 
Observations 1,255 
Notes: The dependent variable is Cash scaled by Assets. The table compares 
the cash holdings of only unlisted REITs when they have access to equity and 
when equity becomes unavailable. 
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. The results are estimated from the following 
baseline model: 
(2)  Cashit = β0 + β1 I{Equity raisingit} + β2 ln(Assetsit) + β3 Leverageit + β4 FFOit 
+ β5 I{Internally advisedit} + β6 LOC availableit  
+ β7 I{Equity raisingit}*ln(Assetsit) + β8 I{Equity raisingit}*Leverageit  
+ β9 I{Equity raisingit}*FFOit 
+ β10 I{Equity raisingit}*I{Internally advisedit}  
+ β11 I{Equity raisingit}*LOC availableit + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
I{Internally advised} is a dummy equals to one in the quarter in which the firm 
is self-advised and zero otherwise. LOC available is bank credit lines available 
scaled by Assets. The variable of interest, I{Equity raising}, takes the value of 
one if the unlisted REIT firm has access to equity and zero otherwise. I{Equity 
raising} is also interacted with the cash holdings controls. Table 8 also has 81 
quarter fixed effects with one quarter suppressed. Standard errors are clustered 
at both the firm and quarter levels. All other variables are defined in Table 1.  
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In Table 14 below, the real estate investment activity results are presented excluding the 
Apple REITs. It can be shown from Table 14 that Cash has a positive impact on real estate 
investment growth even without the Apple REITs.  
Table 14. Real estate investment activity results for unlisted REITs (excluding Apple REITs)  
 
Dependent variable: RE investment growthit                                                                             
         (1)          (2)           (3)  
[post-offering] 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Constant        1.313
**
 1.9        1.408
**
 2.0        0.076 0.3 
ln(Cash)it-1 0.166
***
 2.8         0.197
***
 3.3       -0.036 -1.1 
ln(Proceeds)it-1 0.129
***
 2.9      
ln(Assets)it-1     0.010 0.2    -0.004 -0.1       -0.012 -0.6 
Leverageit-1     0.412 1.0     0.155 0.4  0.337
***
 2.7 
FFOit-1     0.055 0.4    -0.000 0.0        0.005 0.2 
LOC usedit-1     0.297 1.5     0.313 1.6        0.105 1.2 
Property fixed effects          Yes            Yes               Yes 
Quarter fixed effects     Yes[72]        Yes[72]           Yes[81] 
R-Squared 24% 23% 13% 
Observations 527 527 628 
Notes: The dependent variable is percentage real estate investment growth from quarter to 
quarter. The variable is scaled by 100 in order to reduce the magnitude of the coefficients of the 
independent variables and make them easier to interpret. Cash and Proceeds are also logged for 
the same reason. The table examines the impact of cash holdings on real estate investment 
activity. Columns (1) and (2) only consider unlisted REITs with access to equity. In column 
(1), ln(Cash) and ln(Proceeds) are accounted for in the regression. Column (2) excludes equity 
proceeds. In column (3), the sample covers unlisted REITs when equity becomes unavailable. 
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The results are 
estimated from the following baseline model: 
(3)  RE investment growthit = β0 + β1 ln(Cashit-1) + β2 ln(Assetsit-1) + β3 Leverageit-1   
+ β4 FFOit-1 + β5 LOC usedit-1 + Σβj Pj + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
ln(Cash), ln(Proceeds), ln(Assets), Leverage, FFO and LOC used are lagged one quarter. 
Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and quarter levels. All variables are defined in 
Table 1. 
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Table 15 below shows the differences in cash holdings between listed and unlisted REITs. The 
table indicates that unlisted REITs still hold more cash than listed REITs even after excluding 
the Apple REITs from the sample.  
Table 15. Cash holdings results for listed and unlisted REITs  
                (excluding Apple REITs) 
 
Dependent variable: Cashit 
Variable     Coefficient t-stat 
Constant      0.158
***
 7.9 
I{Unlisted REITit}      0.083
***
 4.5 
ln(Assetsit) -0.001 -0.7 
Leverageit     -0.160
***
 -15.8 
FFOit        -0.045
***
 -10.0 
I{Internally advisedit} -0.004 -1.1 
LOC availableit      0.010
***
 2.7 
I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit)     -0.004
***
 -2.7 
I{Unlisted REITit}*Leverageit        -0.001 -0.8 
I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit        -0.000 -1.0 
I{Unlisted REITit}*I{Internally advisedit}  -0.012
*
 -1.7 
I{Unlisted REITit}*LOC availableit    -0.060
***
 -6.0 
Quarter fixed effects            Yes[85] 
R-Squared 30% 
Observations 2,512 
Notes: The dependent variable in Table 15 is Cash scaled by Assets. The 
variable of interest is I{Unlisted REIT}, which takes the value of one if 
the firm is a unlisted REIT and zero otherwise. The table compares the 
cash holdings of listed REITs to unlisted REITs after excluding Apple 
REITs from the unlisted sample. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The 
baseline regression model for Table 15 is: 
(5)  Cashit = β0 + β1 I{Unlisted REITit} + β2 ln(Assetsit) + β3 Leverageit + β4 FFOit  
+ β5 I{Internally advisedit}+ β6 LOC availableit  
+ β7 I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit) + β8 I{Unlisted REITit}*Leverageit  
+ β9 I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit  
+ β10 I{Unlisted REITit}*I{Internally advisedit} 
+ β11 I{Unlisted REITit}*LOC availableit + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and quarter levels. 
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4.2.2 Cash holdings comparison of listed and unlisted REITs after using logic for matching  
The probit matching model in Equation (4) assumes normality in the distribution of the data. The 
matching results will be biased if the data is not normally distributed. In order to ensure that the 
results are not biased, a logit procedure is also applied in the matching. The results showing 
differences in cash holdings between listed and unlisted REITs are shown in Table 16 after using 
a logit model in the matching. As indicated in Table 16, the results are highly consistent with 
before.  
Table 16. Cash holdings results for listed and unlisted REITs (Logit matching) 
 
Dependent variable: Cashit 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Constant            0.126
***
                 6.5 
I{Unlisted REITit}            0.120
***
 6.6 
ln(Assetsit)            0.001 0.7 
Leverageit          -0.156
***
 -16.2 
FFOit          -0.045
***
 -9.8 
I{Internally advisedit}     -0.004 -1.1 
LOC availableit           0.014
***
 3.7 
I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit)         -0.008
***
 -5.5 
I{Unlisted REITit}*Leverageit        0.021
*
 1.7 
I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit     -0.000 -0.8 
I{Unlisted REITit}*I{Internally advisedit}        -0.016
**
 -2.4 
I{Unlisted REITit}*LOC availableit         -0.064
***
 -6.6 
Quarter fixed effects                Yes[85] 
R-Squared 26% 
Observations 2,856 
Notes: The dependent variable in Table 16 is Cash scaled by Assets. The 
variable of interest is I{Unlisted REIT}, which takes the value of one if the 
firm is a unlisted REIT and zero otherwise. The table compares the cash 
holdings of listed REITs to unlisted REITs after using a logic matching 
procedure. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The baseline regression 
model for Table 16 is: 
(5)  Cashit = β0 + β1 I{Unlisted REITit} + β2 ln(Assetsit) + β3 Leverageit + β4 FFOit  
+ β5 I{Internally advisedit}+ β6 LOC availableit  
+ β7 I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit) + β8 I{Unlisted REITit}*Leverageit  
+ β9 I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit  
+ β10 I{Unlisted REITit}*I{Internally advisedit} 
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+ β11 I{Unlisted REITit}*LOC availableit + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
 Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and quarter levels. 
4.2.3 Including property sector controls  
Property sector dummies are included in the cash holdings model as additional controls. Table 17 
below contains the results with property dummies included as additional controls. There are five 
property fixed effects included. The industrial and self-storage property sectors are categorized 
together and suppressed. As Table 17 shows, the variable of interest, I{Unlisted REIT} remains 
positive and significant. 
Table 17. Cash holdings results for listed and unlisted REITs  
    (Property fixed effects included) 
 
Dependent variable: Cashit 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Constant    0.121
***
 6.2 
I{Unlisted REITit}    0.101
***
 5.6 
ln(Assetsit)     -0.000 -0.2 
Leverageit   -0.159
***
 -16.1 
FFOit   -0.043
***
 -9.5 
I{Internally advisedit}      0.002 0.5 
LOC availableit    0.015
***
 4.3 
I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit)   -0.006
***
 -4.4 
I{Unlisted REITit}*Leverageit       0.012 1.0 
I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit      -0.000 -0.7 
I{Unlisted REITit}*I{Internally advisedit}     -0.016
*
 -1.8 
I{Unlisted REITit}*LOC availableit   -0.052
***
 -5.8 
Property fixed effects                Yes 
Quarter fixed effects           Yes[85] 
R-Squared 29% 
Observations 2,856 
Notes: The dependent variable in Table 17 is Cash scaled by Assets. The 
variable of interest is I{Unlisted REIT}, which takes the value of one if the 
firm is a unlisted REIT and zero otherwise. The table compares the cash 
holdings of listed REITs to unlisted REITs and accounting for property 
fixed effects. Five property fixed effects are included in the analysis. 
Industrial and self-storage property types are categorized together and 
suppressed. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The baseline 
regression equation for Table 17 is: 
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(5)  Cashit = β0 + β1 I{Unlisted REITit} + β2 ln(Assetsit) + β3 Leverageit + β4 FFOit  
+ β5 I{Internally advisedit}+ β6 LOC availableit  
+ β7 I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit) + β8 I{Unlisted REITit}*Leverageit  
+ β9 I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit  
+ β10 I{Unlisted REITit}*I{Internally advisedit} 
+ β11 I{Unlisted REITit}*LOC availableit + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and quarter levels. 
4.2.4 Accounting for changes in legislation and full sample results  
Given that the sample is collected over a longer time period, changes in legislation over the 
period may impact the results. In order to account for some of the legislation changes, the 
analysis for cash holdings begins from 1993 instead of 1991 in order to recognize the modern 
REIT era. The cash holdings model is also estimated from the year 2001 onwards to account for 
reductions in REIT dividend payments from 95% to 90% of taxable income. As an additional 
robustness check, the full sample analyses sans matching are undertaken (Tables 18-20).  
In Table 18 below, the results for the analysis starting 1993 are presented. The dependent 
variable in Table 18 is Cash scaled by Assets. Table 18 examines differences in cash holdings 
between listed and unlisted REITs from 1993. The variable of interest is I{Unlisted REIT}, 
which takes the value of one if the firm is a unlisted REIT and zero otherwise. It can been seen 
that I{Unlisted REIT} remains qualitatively similar. 
Table 18. Cash holdings results for listed and unlisted REITs (from 1993) 
 
Dependent variable: Cashit 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Constant             0.131
***
                 6.6 
I{Unlisted REITit}             0.115
***
 6.2 
ln(Assetsit)             0.000 0.3 
Leverageit           -0.153
***
 -15.2 
FFOit           -0.043
***
 -9.5 
I{Internally advisedit}       -0.003 -1.0 
LOC availableit             0.013
***
 3.6 
I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit)            -0.007
***
 -5.1 
I{Unlisted REITit}*Leverageit         0.018 1.4 
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I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit        -0.000 -0.8 
I{Unlisted REITit}*I{Internally advisedit}            -0.017
***
 -2.5 
I{Unlisted REITit}*LOC availableit            -0.063
***
 -6.5 
Quarter fixed effects                Yes[80] 
R-Squared 25% 
Observations 2,850 
Notes: The dependent variable in Table 18 is Cash scaled by Assets. The 
variable of interest is I{Unlisted REIT}, which takes the value of one if the 
firm is a unlisted REIT and zero otherwise. The table compares the cash 
holdings of listed REITs to unlisted REITs with the sample period starting 
from 1993. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The baseline regression 
model for Table 16 is: 
(5)  Cashit = β0 + β1 I{Unlisted REITit} + β2 ln(Assetsit) + β3 Leverageit + β4 FFOit  
+ β5 I{Internally advisedit}+ β6 LOC availableit  
+ β7 I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit) + β8 I{Unlisted REITit}*Leverageit  
+ β9 I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit  
+ β10 I{Unlisted REITit}*I{Internally advisedit} 
+ β11 I{Unlisted REITit}*LOC availableit + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and quarter levels. 
In Table 19 below, the results for the analysis with the sample period beginning in 2001 
are presented. The dependent variable in Table 19 is Cash scaled by Assets. Table 19 examines 
differences in cash holdings between listed and unlisted REITs. The variable of interest is 
I{Unlisted REIT}, which takes the value of one if the firm is a unlisted REIT and zero otherwise. 
I{Unlisted REIT}, remains qualitatively similar. The signs and significant levels of the control 
variables are largely consistent as well.  
Table 19. Cash holdings results for listed and unlisted REITs (from 2001) 
 
Dependent variable: Cashit 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Constant             0.210
***
                 8.1 
I{Unlisted REITit}             0.085
***
 2.8 
ln(Assetsit)            -0.005
***
 -3.3 
Leverageit            -0.144
***
 -11.1 
FFOit            -0.043
***
 -8.8 
I{Internally advisedit}            -0.009
***
 -2.6 
LOC availableit        -0.001 -0.1 
I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit)            -0.005
***
 -2.5 
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I{Unlisted REITit}*Leverageit        0.000  0.0 
I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit        0.000 1.6 
I{Unlisted REITit}*I{Internally advisedit}           -0.029
***
 -4.1 
I{Unlisted REITit}*LOC availableit           -0.058
***
 -5.1 
Quarter fixed effects                Yes[48] 
R-Squared 28% 
Observations 2,174 
Notes: The dependent variable in Table 19 is Cash scaled by Assets. The 
variable of interest is I{Unlisted REIT}, which takes the value of one if the 
firm is a unlisted REIT and zero otherwise. The table compares the cash 
holdings of listed REITs to unlisted REITs with the sample period starting 
from 2001. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The baseline regression 
model for Table 16 is: 
(5)  Cashit = β0 + β1 I{Unlisted REITit} + β2 ln(Assetsit) + β3 Leverageit + β4 FFOit  
+ β5 I{Internally advisedit}+ β6 LOC availableit  
+ β7 I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit) + β8 I{Unlisted REITit}*Leverageit  
+ β9 I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit  
+ β10 I{Unlisted REITit}*I{Internally advisedit} 
+ β11 I{Unlisted REITit}*LOC availableit + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and quarter levels. 
In Table 20 below, results for the full sample without the matching procedure are 
presented. The dependent variable in Table 20 is Cash scaled by Assets. Table 20 examines 
differences in cash holdings between listed and unlisted REITs. The variable of interest is 
I{Unlisted REIT}, which takes the value of one if the firm is a unlisted REIT and zero otherwise. 
Results for I{Unlisted REIT} are qualitatively similar to prior evidence provided in this 
dissertation. The signs and significance of the control variables are largely consistent as well. 
Table 20. Cash holdings results for listed and unlisted REITs  
                  (Full sample without matching) 
 
Dependent variable: Cashit 
Variable Coefficient t-stat 
Constant      0.142
***
                 16.5 
I{Unlisted REITit}      0.089
***
 6.7 
ln(Assetsit)     -0.004
***
 -9.5 
Leverageit    -0.060
***
 -12.4 
FFOit    -0.035
***
 -12.0 
I{Internally advisedit}     -0.002 -1.5 
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LOC availableit   0.001 0.6 
I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit)     -0.002
**
 -2.1 
I{Unlisted REITit}*Leverageit      -0.069
***
  -7.2 
I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit  -0.001 -1.4 
I{Unlisted REITit}*I{Internally advisedit}      -0.017
***
 -2.9 
I{Unlisted REITit}*LOC availableit      -0.050
***
 -5.5 
Quarter fixed effects                Yes[85] 
R-Squared 24% 
Observations 9,422 
Notes: The dependent variable in Table 20 is Cash scaled by Assets. The 
variable of interest is I{Unlisted REIT}, which takes the value of one if the 
firm is a unlisted REIT and zero otherwise. The table compares the cash 
holdings of listed REITs to unlisted REITs for the full sample without 
matching. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
***
, 
** 
and 
*
 indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The baseline regression 
model for Table 16 is: 
(5)  Cashit = β0 + β1 I{Unlisted REITit} + β2 ln(Assetsit) + β3 Leverageit + β4 FFOit  
+ β5 I{Internally advisedit}+ β6 LOC availableit  
+ β7 I{Unlisted REITit}*ln(Assetsit) + β8 I{Unlisted REITit}*Leverageit  
+ β9 I{Unlisted REITit}*FFOit  
+ β10 I{Unlisted REITit}*I{Internally advisedit} 
+ β11 I{Unlisted REITit}*LOC availableit + Σβk Qk + ɛit. 
Standard errors are clustered at both the firm and quarter levels. 
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CHAPTER FIVE―CONCLUSIONS   
5.0 Conclusions 
Understanding the manner in which firms manage their liquidity needs is important for academic 
research as well as for investors. This dissertation examines the underlying drivers of cash-
hoarding behavior for unlisted REITs, extending the limited body of existing literature on REIT 
liquidity management and adding to the under-explored area of research on unlisted REITs. The 
central argument in this dissertation is that the need to have preventative cash accumulated in 
anticipation of any future liquidity shortfalls is very important for unlisted REITs because of 
their high costs of equity issuance, limited availability of other sources of funds and the fact that 
their equity fundraising period comes to a definite closure at some point. With this argument in 
mind, the broad objective of study is to extend the academic literature on liquidity management 
by examining a sector where investment occurs in similar assets and financial constraints are 
exogenously determined. Within the broader context, this dissertation examines four specific 
issues. 
 First, a model is estimated for the responsiveness of cash accumulation to equity issuance 
for unlisted REITs. The results from this model suggest that unlisted REITs use a significant 
portion of their equity issuance proceeds to increase their precautionary cash holdings when they 
have access to equity. Specifically, the results show that for every additional dollar of equity 
raised in the previous period, 25 cents of that is accumulated as cash in the current period by 
unlisted firms. When other sources of capital are accounted for in the analysis (including 
leverage, bank credit lines available and FFO), the estimated coefficient reduces by just 3 cents 
per dollar. The 3 cents differential is attributed to bank lines of credit; firms with access to bank 
lines of credit reduce their need to accumulate precautionary cash from equity proceeds.  
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With the second objective, the nature of the cash holdings for unlisted REITs is compared 
for periods of equity access versus periods when new equity is no longer available. The findings 
indicate that, conditional on all other controls in the analysis, unlisted REITs tend to hold greater 
amounts of cash during periods when there is access to equity. This is at odds with the extant 
finance literature on cash holdings which suggests that firms with better access to capital are less 
inclined to hoard cash. There are several possible explanations for why this result may exist for 
unlisted REITs. First, when unlisted REITs have access to equity, they are able to save some of 
the proceeds as cash. Second, future FFO is less predictable for unlisted REITs during the equity 
access period. Finally, short-term liquidity may be required to support rapid real estate 
investment growth during the period of equity access. The summary statistics in Table 2 show 
that real estate investment growth for unlisted REITs is 78% when they have access to equity 
compared to only 7% when equity access is unavailable.  
 The third objective estimates the sensitivity of real estate investment growth to cash for 
unlisted REITs. Access to capital has a clear impact on the investment activity of a firm. The 
dissertation provides evidence that cash is positively related to the real estate investment growth 
of unlisted REITs who have access to equity. Considering investment activity during the post-
offering period, unlisted REITs are found to rely on Leverage to a greater degree in order to 
support subsequent investment growth, which is generally much lower by this point (on average, 
7% per quarter). Cash is more valuable to unlisted REITs during the equity offering period when 
the real estate investment growth is highest (on average, 78% per quarter).  
The final objective examines differences in cash holdings and bank line of credit 
utilization for a matched sample of listed and unlisted REITs. This research finds that unlisted 
REITs accumulate more cash than their listed counterparts overall (about 12% more cash). 
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Relative to listed REITs, the quantity of cash held is pronounced during periods when they have 
access to equity (about 22% greater). Even unlisted REITs without access to equity still hold 9% 
more cash than listed REITs. When unlisted REITs bank credit lines utilization is examined 
relative to the sample of listed REITs, unlisted REIT credit utilization is found to be 28% less. 
Unlike unrestricted cash reserves, bank credit lines use is associated with increase requirements 
for transparency and monitoring (Yun, 2009; An, Hardin and Wu, 2012; Acharya, Almeida, 
Ippolito, and Perez, 2014). Previous studies have discussed the transparent nature of listed REITs 
compared to other firms (e.g., Hardin, Highfield, Hill, and Kelly, 2009; Ghosh, Petrova, and 
Xiao, 2012). The higher utilization of bank credit lines by listed REITs compared to the unlisted 
sample is consistent with the greater degree of transparency in the listed REIT sector.  
 Taken together, this dissertation highlights the importance of cash in the decisions of 
unlisted REITs. This paper adds to the existing limited body of literature on REIT cash holdings. 
The study specifically focuses on unlisted REITs which have recently become very important 
asset classes in the portfolios of many investors but research in that area has been under-
explored. Novel findings are provided on the nature of cash holdings and investment activity of a 
unique set of firms that have the opportunity to replenish cash through equity subscriptions and 
after closure of such subscriptions. The paper further extends beyond unlisted REITs presenting 
seminal results on differences in cash holding choices and bank credit lines utilization of unlisted 
and listed REITs. The approach considers how noted differences in transparency will impact 
liquidity management between the two groups. Overall, the results imply that the increased 
operational risk at unlisted REITs makes them more inclined to hold excess liquidity reserves 
consisting primarily of cash. Cash provides unlisted REITs with self-managed insurance against 
liquidity shocks and offers greater financial flexibility when compared to banker-managed credit 
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lines. In theory, unlisted REITs can also rely on internally-generated future cash flow to fund 
liquidity needs but its anticipated flow is rather unpredictable for an early-stage “blind pool” 
fund. The findings from this dissertation may be useful to understanding cash holdings and 
liquidity management, in general, in other financial intermediaries including private equity and 
venture capital firms that have some characteristics of unlisted REITs (although there is very 
limited data availability to explore the private firm sector). An advantage of providing such 
evidence through the lens of unlisted REITs results from the consistent regulatory structure 
which causes REITs to invest in comparable assets – the same cannot be said for other private 
equity funds.  
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